国際法と民主主義の矛盾

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Foreign Affairs (July/August 2013)に掲載された

Jon Kyl, Douglas J. Feith, and John Fonte, “How New International Law Undermines Democratic Sovereignty” という論文がなかなか面白かったです。

タイトルから推測できるようにこの論文は、国際法の進展がいかに民主主義国家の主権を弱めているかについて議論した論文です。

グローバリゼーション(globalization)、トランスナショナリズム(transnationalism)、グローバルガバナンス(global governance)といったbuzzwordが大好きな人も嫌いな人も、それが民主主義とどう関わっているかよく理解していない人が多いようです。この論文は民主主義支持の立場から、国際主義者が国際条約の批准を各国に求める動きがいかに民主主義の理念と矛盾しているか明らかにしています。

トランスナショナリストはこう主張します。

National sovereignty, they contend, is growing increasingly problematic, impeding the achievement of multinational solutions to public policy problems. They argue that democratic and nondemocratic nations should share sovereignty and subordinate aspects of lawmaking to global legal regimes.

Transnationalists argue that in the interest of promoting “global governance,” U.S. officials should bring the Constitution and American law into conformity with “global norms,” thus effectively elevating those norms above the Constitution.

トランスナショナリズムの第一人者が韓国系アメリカ人のHarold Kohです。Koh氏はエール大学ロースクールのディーンを務め、クリントンやオバマ政権で国務省スタッフともなった非常に有名な国際法学者です。6歳の時にポリオにかかり今も足が不自由です。

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Koh has been a compelling advocate of what he calls “the transnational legal process,” whereby “transnational private actors” blend domestic and international legal processes to incorporate or internalize so-called global legal norms into domestic law. “Key agents in promoting this process of internalization include transnational norm entrepreneurs, governmental norm sponsors, transnational issue networks, and interpretive communities,” he wrote in a 2006 Penn State International Law Review article. “In this story, one of these agents triggers an interaction at the international level, works together with other agents of internalization to force an interpretation of the international legal norm in an interpretive forum, and then continues to work with those agents to persuade a resisting nation-state to internalize that interpretation into domestic law.” In the same law journal article, Koh wrote about the way international law can be “downloaded” into U.S. law.

トランスナショナリスト学派は慣習法的な国際法の考え方を根本から変えようとします。あるruleが国際法として認められるには2つの基準を満たす必要があると考えられていました。まず第1に、多数の国が長期間にわたってそれを遵守していること。第2に法的な義務感からそれを遵守していることです。

Since the 1990s, a new international law has emerged, incorporating aspects of transnational and supranational law. This view takes an innovative approach to what is known as customary international law, the slowly developing body of law that is induced from nations’ long-standing and widespread practice — for example, refraining from harming ambassadors. Traditionally, a rule qualifies as customary international law if it meets two standards: first, numerous nations have adhered to it in practice over a long period of time, and second, the nations adhered to it not for reasons of convenience or mere policy but out of a sense of legal obligation.

トランスナショナリストはこの法の概念を無視し、国家間でこのルールを守ろうという合意ができれば国際法として認められると主張します。バージニア大学の国際法学者Paul Stephanはそれをthe antithesis of democracyと呼びます。

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Transnationalists are attempting to change the meaning of “state practice.” To make it easier to assert that a rule has become customary international law, they contend that the state-practice requirement can be satisfied with words — that is, by proof not that states have actually complied with the rule, let alone consistently, but that officials have merely spoken in favor of it. As the University of Virginia law professor Paul Stephan has noted, this view of customary international law holds that “state practice entails not the observable behavior of states, which is messy and often lawless, but rather what states assert as norms.” “In other words,” he writes, proponents of this view “mean not what states and their agents do, but rather what they say.” Stephan observes that this kind of “new international law . . . embraces a system of formulating and imposing norms on state and individual behavior that operates outside of any publicly accountable institution.” He rightly labels this approach “the antithesis of democracy.”

民主主義の観点から問題となるのは、トランスナショナリズムの考えを推し進めると、国内法の基盤が国民の声を無視して外国の政府や非政府組織(nongovernmental organization)に委ねられてしまうからです。2012年12月に上院がthe UN Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities(国連障害者の権利条約)の批准を拒否したのもそのためでした。

Little light was shed on why any senator would appear to subordinate the interests of the disabled to an ideological abstraction such as sovereignty. But what sank the treaty was not heartlessness, nor was it any abstract quibble. Rather, opponents were worried about something practical and fundamental: whether U.S. laws should be made by politicians held accountable to Americans through the ballot box or by unaccountable officials in multinational organizations. If the treaty has a practical effect, it will be due in large part to interpretations made by foreign government officials and judges and by nongovernmental organizations, none answerable to American voters.

If officials are going to make rules for Americans on such matters, those officials should be Americans, democratically accountable to voters.

キーワードは民主的アカウンタビリティ(democratic accountability)です。三権分立では立法権は議会(Congress)にあります。アメリカでは上院(the Senate)と下院(the House of Representatives)がそれにあたります。トランスナショナリストは行政もしくは司法に働きかけることで他国の国内法を変えようとしますが、それは三権分立の原則に反します。

These ideas no doubt appeal to those who support the progressive policies at issue. But they are disrespectful toward the U.S. Constitution and dismissive of the idea that the American people should be able to elect — and eject — the officials who make their laws. The transnationalists challenge not merely the technicalities of lawmaking but the very essence of democratic accountability. Transnationalists do not have grandiose plans for one-world government, but they do want to give various rules the force of law without having to win majorities for those rules in democratically elected legislatures. This is not the way lawmaking is supposed to work under the U.S. Constitution.

国民の投票から選ばれる議員で構成される議会の審議を経ないまま法律が変わるというのは民主主義に反する行為です。アメリカ合衆国憲法の父であるジェームズ・マディスンはこう述べています。

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Notwithstanding the different modes in which [federal and state governments] are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. . . . The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. . . . The ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone.

結局、国際条約を批准するか否かを決定するのは一人一人の国民であるわけです。この論文の著者はとくに司法が法律改定に介入することを警句を吐いています。国際条約の批准が国内政治問題化することは、民主主義国では当然であり、それが政治化しない方が望ましいという考えこそが危険なわけです。

In a Madisonian framework, federal courts cannot unilaterally decide which putative international laws should be domesticated to bind Americans at home. If U.S. judges or officials enforce new international laws, they are engaged in lawmaking, which is a legislative, not a judicial, function. If the people deem a law unwise, they can hold lawmakers accountable at the polls, a crucial check on power in a constitutional democracy. Not so with judges. Obviously, federal courts have a major role to play in interpreting international law, but there are often serious questions as to whether a rule or a norm supposedly qualifying as international law is really law and actually applies to the United States. Federal courts should not be the sole arbiters of such questions, and neither should executive-branch officials.

In Taming Globalization, the law professors John Yoo and Julian Ku argue that Americans should interpret international law in a manner consistent with the United States’ constitutional framework, including the separation of powers, federalism, and popular sovereignty. The most crucial question in politics is always, who decides? When it comes to determining what constitutes binding international law, the answer should be officials accountable to the American people. As Alexander Hamilton noted, the people are the principal and the government is the agent.

The United States has an interest in promoting respect for international law that strengthens, rather than undermines, its constitutional system. Indeed, Americans can benefit from international cooperation that is rooted in countries’ widespread acceptance of useful rules of the road. But U.S. officials should adopt such rules, as they do with domestic legislation, through democratic processes. New rules should not be imposed by the executive branch through extraconstitutional machinations, and they should not be decreed by activist judges exploiting the democracy-unfriendly theories of the transnational legal movement.

ちなみにこの論文でターゲットにされているHarold Koh氏は必ずしも左翼の学者とは位置づけられません。彼はオバマ政権の「無人機による標的殺害(targeted killing by aerial drone strikes)」が国際法と矛盾しないと主張したことで(Because drone technology is highly precise, if properly controlled, it could be more lawful and more consistent with human rights and humanitarian law than the alternatives.)、リベラルな学者から批判を受けています。詳しい内容はThe Atlanticに掲載された

Harold Koh’s Slippery, Inadequate Criticism of the Drone Warをお読みください。

7月 25, 2013 · Pukuro · No Comments
Posted in: ☆国際問題

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