日本の売春制度の変遷

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Sarah Kovner, Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan (Stanford, Cali.: Stanford University Press, 2012)を読了。Kovner先生はフロリダ大学歴史学部で准教授をつとめています(彼女のウェブサイトはhttp://www.sarahkovner.com/)。本書は日本の売春制度の変遷を詳細に分析した研究書です。「売春」とは、「対償を受け、又は受ける約束で、不特定の相手方と性交すること」を指します。多くのヨーロッパ諸国が売春行為を合法化する中、日本では1956年に成立した売春防止法に基づき、売春はいまだ禁止となっています。ただし、実際にはソープランドら抜け道も用意され、ざる法と考えている人も多く、太古から存在する売春を違法化するのは不可能だと考えている人も多いようです。実は戦前日本では売春は合法でした。公に営業を許可された売春婦を公娼と呼びますが、日本では豊臣秀吉が京都に遊郭設置を認めて以来、1946年にマッカーサーが禁止令を出すまでずっと公娼制度がとられていました。なぜ公娼制度は復活せずに、建前上は売春行為が禁止されることになったのか。興味がある方は本書を一読してみてください。よくまとまった良書だと思います。

以下、思いつくまま記した読書ノートから抜粋。

目次
Introduction: A Special Business (pp.1-17)
1. “To Transship Them to Some Suitable Island”: Making Policy in the Midst of Chaos (pp.18-48)
2. Violence, Commerce, Marriage (pp.49-73)
3. When Flesh Glittered Selling Sex in Sasebo and Tokyo (pp.74-98)
4. Legislating Women: The Push for a Prostitution Prevention Law (pp.99-108)
5. The High Politics of Base Pleasures: Regulating Morality for the Postwar Era (pp.119-138)
6. The Presence of the Past Controversies over Sex Work since 1956 (pp.139-151)
Conclusion: Beyond Victimhood (pp.152-158)

本書のまとめ
For more than 300 years, Japan had tolerated and regulated the performance of sexual services for remuneration. Other more eclectic accounts have surveyed this earlier era, when authorities demarcated “pleasure districts,” recognized debt contracts, and certified the health of sex workers. Occupying Power seeks to explain how and why the arrival of masses of foreign soldiers shifted the long-established landscape of the sex industry in fundamental ways. Together with the more generally democratizing policies of Allied officials, which gave greater voice to female political activists, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of servicemen struck Japan like an earthquake. The aftershocks produced a new political configuration that finally abolished licensed prostitution. Ironically, and tragically, abolition made sex workers less visible and more vulnerable. (pp.1-2)

This transition from regulated sex work, to outright deregulation, to criminalization—all in a period of unprecedented social upheaval—remains unique in the annals of the “oldest profession.” The response of the Japanese people to the Allied Occupation was mediated through the bodies of individual women, as the nation was transformed from a conquering power to a conquered people. This provoked a reevaluation of sex work and gave a new and urgent credence to movements dedicated to its abolition. Popular distaste for prostitution with non-Japanese clients not only ended three centuries of regulated sex work but also changed the way Japanese remembered their own roles as occupiers of foreign lands, with consequences that continue to roil international relations across East Asia and the Pacific. (p.5)

日本の売春制度の変遷公娼制度がスタートしたのは1589年。その年に豊臣秀吉が京都に遊郭を設置。江戸時代に新町(大阪)、丸山(長崎)、吉原(江戸)に遊郭が作られます。
In 1589, Toyotomi Hideyoshi established the first regulated “pleasure district” (yūkaku) in Kyoto. The Tokugawa shogunate that ruled Japan from 1603 established other licensed quarters: Shinmachi, in the commercial city of Osaka, in 1610, and Maruyama in the port city of Nagasaki in 1642. The most famous district of all, the Yoshiwara, was approved by the shogunate in 1617. It opened in the city of Edo, now Tokyo, in 1618. By this point, sex work had already begun to assume myriad forms and constitute an elaborate hierarchy, including courtesans, streetwalkers, maidservants, and military camp followers. (p.10)

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明治維新後も公娼制度は存続されます。公娼への性病検査は義務化され、1927年に成立した花柳病予防法により、性病検査は週一となります。
Japanese policy and practice displayed a very different tendency. Commercial sex work had been tolerated and regulated in Japan for more than three hundred years. In Japan, as in other places, venereal diseases were considered prostitutes’ diseases, and therefore disease-fighting focused solely on this population. With the opening of treaty ports, this included lock hospitals that confined those found to be infected. The British helped to establish the first such institution in Yokohama in 1868. Beginning in the 1870s, Japanese authorities also adopted the French practice of making medical exams compulsory. The Japanese National Hygiene Bureau gathered statistics on the percentage infected, and Western-style newspapers reported the results. The state’s focus on the health and welfare of the Japanese nation and especially its army brought even more restrictions on sex workers, although no similar measures applied to the general population. In 1927, the Law for the Prevention of Venereal Disease provided for weekly examination of licensed prostitutes, the establishment by the Ministry of Welfare of clinics to treat and examine prostitutes and anyone else who had VD, and the punishment of affected persons. Those who procured customers or owned brothels and knew that their prostitutes had VD were also subject to punishment under the 1927 legislation. (p.21)

1880年代以降、多数の日本人女性が娼婦として働くために東アジアや東南アジアに渡ります。彼女らはからゆきさんと呼ばれていました。現地でどんな仕事をするか知らずに渡った人たちも多数おり、その多くが現地で若くして亡くなります。
Starting in the 1880s, Japanese sex workers formed part of a larger, transnational market that included port cities across Southeast and East Asia. They were among the more than 100,000 Japanese women who emigrated over the following fifty years. Known as karayuki-san, they fled impoverished communities, particularly in northwest Kyushu, to seek work in such places as Rangoon, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Although many women were unaware of the kind of work that awaited them, others, especially those from Shimabara or the Amakusa Islands, knowingly entered the profession. (p.13)

からゆきさんについてはVassilos Bill Mihalopulos氏の一連の著作も参照することをお薦めします。
“Finding Work Through Sex: Transforming Pre-war Japanese Female Migrant Labourers into Prostitutes 1870–1930.” Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2001.
“Ousting the Prostitute, Retelling the Story of the Karayuki-san.” Postcolonial Studies 4, no. 2 (2001): 169–87.
“Mediating the Good Life: Prostitution and the Japanese Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 1880s—1920s.” Gender and History 21, no.i (2009): 19–38.
Sex in Japan’s Globalization, 1870-1930: Prostitutes, Emigration and Nation-Building.
James Francis WarrenのAh Ku and Karayuki-san: Prostitution in Singapore, 1870–1940もからゆきさんについて詳細に分析しています。。
https://i2.wp.com/livedoor.blogimg.jp/parumo_zaeega/imgs/7/f/7fcd2f02.jpg

公娼制度は植民地であった台湾と韓国にも導入されます。満州事変以後は満州・中国にも売春婦は進出します。
At the same time that the state sought to prevent Japanese sex workers from operating in foreign territories, it extended the system of licensed prostitution to its colonies. Licensed prostitution was introduced in Taiwan after the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Even though the Japanese did not gain control of Korea until 1905, the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 had given them extraterritorial status, and Japanese-run brothels in Pusan and Wonsan soon followed. After Korea became a protectorate, prostitution was permitted in restaurants, and prostitutes began to be licensed in 1916. (p.13)

At the same time, Japan—like other signatories to the convention— exempted its own colonies. By 1930, Japanese emigration to other parts of the world may have been much reduced, but there was outgoing traffic to Manchuria, Korea, and China—places where licensed prostitution flourished and where no passports were needed. In 1930, Korea had 25 licensed quarters, 510 establishments, and 303 licensed prostitutes (207 of whom were Korean). These statistics suggest that many more women were working as unlicensed prostitutes. In the Japanese metropole, the equivalent statistics for the end of 1929 show 541 licensed quarters, 11,154 licensed brothels, and 50,056 licensed prostitutes. Although most Japanese prostitution activists did not protest the conditions in the colonies, the Salvation Army maintained a home in Darien, and activists such as Masutomi Masasuke from the YMCA sought to rescue women from Manchuria. (p.103)
◆植民地での管理売春についてはSong, Youn-ok. “Japanese Colonial Rule and State-Managed Prostitution: Korea’s Licensed Prostitutes.” positions 5, no. I (1997): 171–217も参照しよう。

本書は今のキャバクラの前身みたいな大正カフェについても言及しています。
As in other countries, the phenomenon of the “modern girl” inspired new notions of independence and sexuality. In the popular press, commentators focused on café waitresses, who worked in a highly eroticized atmosphere and received their wages from tips. Although evidence suggests that sexual labor was not mandatory and occurred outside the café premises, many women probably engaged in extra-hours activities. Moreover, unlike most sex workers, they had control—albeit negotiated—over their bodies and their choice of clients. (p.14)
◆大正カフェについてはElise K. TiptonのPink Collar Work: The Café Waitress in Early Twentieth Century Japanと斎藤光氏の「ジャンル『カフェー』の成立と普及(1)」「ジャンル『カフェー』の成立と普及(2)」も参照しよう。

日本の公娼制度は第2次世界大戦に敗北することで様変わりします。連合国軍の兵士や民間人が多数日本に駐留しますが米兵等が日本の女性に対して強姦することをおそれた日本政府は直ちに慰安所の設置を決めます。コンドームの無料配布も実施されます。
The number of Allied servicemen would peak at 430,000 in late 1945 and early 1946. It gradually declined until 1950, when most of the BCOF forces had departed and just 115,000 Americans remained. During the Korean War, it would more than double again, to 260,000. (p.19)

The arrangement of sexual services for Allied servicemen was rapid and well-funded. It was overseen by future prime minister Ikeda Hayato, at that time director of the Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. The first meeting took place just a week after surrender and before the arrival of occupation troops. By August 18, 1945, Tanaka Yūichi, Home Ministry Security Division chief, had already telegraphed the governors and police chiefs of each prefecture about establishing special comfort stations as a bulwark (bōhatei) against the danger posed by foreign servicemen. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board met that same day and assigned the task to the Tokyo Restaurant Association (Tōkyō Ryōri Inshokugyō Kumiai), which included representatives from the geisha union as well as restaurateurs. On August 21, 1945, military envoy Lieutenant General Kawabe Kōjiro discussed the “needs” of the incoming Allied forces before an audience of the most powerful statesmen in Japan. He spoke at the prime minister’s residence in Nagata-chō, still the center for political power-brokering in Tokyo. (p.22)

A month after U.S. troops landed, the First Cavalry Division had set up four prophylactic stations in “major prostitution areas of Tokyo”—Senju, Mokojuna, Yokohama Road, and the First Brigade area—where servicemen could obtain free condoms. (p.27)

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日本にきた米兵の中には、すでに性病にかかっていた者も多く、日本国内で性病患者が一気に増加します。
Why were so many U.S. troops in Japan infected with VD? Though never acknowledged by commanders such as White, many were already infected when they arrived. In January 1945, the rate of infection among U.S. Army forces in the Pacific was 5 cases per 1,000, virtually the same as reported in the general population in the continental United States. But by June, two months before any troops arrived in Japan, it had soared to 97 per 1,000. The Army Medical Department found that, as military operations wound down in the Philippines, there was a post-combat “letdown” and “increased leisure.” These same troops in the Philippines had two more months of “leisure” before they embarked for Japan, while others came from Hawaii and the Marianas. Even if the rate of infection had not increased, the level recorded in June suggests that tens of thousands of infected U.S. soldiers were about to land in Yokohama, Yokosuka, Sasebo, and dozens of other Japanese seaports and landing fields. This was a “reservoir” of disease that would soon begin to wash over an unsuspecting people. (pp.31-2)

Of course, along with hundreds of thousands of Allied troops with high rates of infection, millions of repatriated Japanese soldiers and colonists may well have contributed to the spread of disease. Many of the women had been sexually assaulted after the surrender and were widely suspected of being infected. But when infection rates are broken down by prefecture, they provide good reason to believe that Allied servicemen were indeed a major source of infection and would remain so. In 1949, three years after the bulk of repatriates had returned, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, and Kanagawa had the highest rates of VD. All had U.S. military bases and large numbers of servicemen. Nagasaki, with Sasebo Naval Base and the Thirty-Fourth Infantry Division, had 7.41 cases per 1,000 compared to a national rate of 4.46. Fukuoka, a short train journey away, was a popular R&R destination for both U.S. and BCOF troops, and also hosted Itazuke Air Base. Its rate was 9.36. And Kanagawa, with Yokosuka Naval Base and Atsugi Naval Air Station, had a VD rate of 11.9 cases per 1,000. During the Korean War, Kanagawa and Fukuoka continued to have the highest reported disease rates in the country. They were followed by Nagasaki, Hiroshima—with Kure Naval Base—and Yamaguchi, with the Marine Corps Air Station at Iwakuni. (pp.32-3)

梅毒と淋病にもっと効く薬はペニシリンだったのですが、米政府はペニシリン不足のため日本国内での使用を禁止します。それも性病増加につながります。
For those found to have VD, penicillin would have been the most effective treatment. It was clearly superior to the former treatment, drugs from the sulfonamide group. These “sulfa” drugs were increasingly ineffective as bacteria became resistant. But in 1945, a shortage of penicillin for U.S. civilians caused Washington to prohibit the use of U.S. penicillin on Japanese and Koreans. They also forbade sharing technical literature on how to mass-produce penicillin, deeming such information a state secret. (p.43)

ちなみに日本にはどれくらいの売春婦がいたのでしょうか。著者のKovnerによれば、1925年には31人に1人の女性(18~29歳)、1955年には25人に1人の女性(15~29歳)が性風俗業で働いていたそうです。
After 1945, Japanese politicians and journalists in the popular and elite press focused on what they portrayed as enormous growth in sex work. The data available are more uncertain and suggest that, although there may have been significant growth, it was not as dramatic as often portrayed. In 1925, it is estimated that one of every thirty-one young women between eighteen and twenty-nine worked in the commercial sex market. Thirty years later, an even rougher estimate indicates that one in twenty-five women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine was so employed. (pp.75-6)

In 1955, it was estimated that one in every twenty-five women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine worked in the commercial sex industry. (p.19)

1948年には性病予防法が公布されます。同年、吉原では新吉原保健組合が設立され、売春婦の性病対策がとられます。
If any licensed quarter might have maintained its distinctive character, it would have been the Yoshiwara, the most famous amusement quarter, glamorous, if notorious, since the beginning of the seventeenth century. After 1945, the quarter and the sex workers employed there faced unprecedented challenges: the destruction of the wartime air raids, the discontinuation of licensed sex work, and the ongoing Occupation. But the Venereal Disease Law of 1948, which required health inspections and reporting of statistics, gave proprietors and workers of the Yoshiwara the means to put forward a healthy and hygienic front in their competition with panpan. Their health union, called the New Yoshiwara Women’s Health Preservation Association (Shin-Yoshiwara Joshi Hoken Kumiai), conducted weekly VD inspections. The union hierarchy wanted to show that the elite sex workers of the Yoshiwara were the healthiest in Tokyo, and thus shield them from restrictive legislation. Yet the reliability of their inspections was questionable, since sex workers were frequently examined at union headquarters, rather than at independent medical establishments. Contemporary critics viewed the unions as manipulated by proprietors. (p.90)

そして1956年に売春防止法に関する法案が国会に提出され可決されますが、1948からの経過についてウィキの説明をコピペしておきます。

売春防止法の元祖は、1948年(昭和23年)の第2回国会において、売春等処罰法案として提出されたものである。しかし、処罰の範囲等に関する合意の形成が不十分であったため、厳格すぎるとして審議未了、廃案となった。しばらく間を置いた後の1953年(昭和28年)から1955年(昭和30年)にかけて、第15回、第19回、第21回、第22回国会において、神近市子などの女性議員によって、議員立法として同旨の法案が繰り返し提出された。これらは多数決の結果、いずれも廃案となった。第22回国会では連立与党の日本民主党が反対派から賛成派に回り、一時は法案が可決されるものと思われたが、最終的には否決された。

1956年(昭和31年)、第4回参議院議員通常選挙を控える中で、第24回国会が開催された。自由民主党は選挙に向けて女性票を維持および獲得しようとの狙いから、売春対策審議会の答申を容れて、一転して売春防止法の成立に賛同した。法案は5月2日に国会へ提出され、同月21日に可決した。売春防止法は翌年の1957年(昭和32年)4月1日から施行されることになったが、刑事処分については1年間の猶予期間が設けられ、1958年(昭和33年)4月1日から適用するものとされた。

Occupying Powerでもこの過程が詳細に語られています。
In 1948, growing sentiment against base prostitution and panpan led the Ashida government to present the first anti-prostitution bill of the postwar era to the Second Session of the Diet. The Punishment of Prostitution and Related Activities Bill (Baishuntō Shobatsu Hōan) was drafted by the attorney general’s office, then submitted for approval to General Headquarters on May 8, 1948, the usual practice during the Allied Occupation. It defined “prostitution” as sexual intercourse (seikō) for pay and would have made both clients and sex workers liable for up to two years of hard labor and a 10,000-yen fine for a first offense. Sex workers were defined as female by the use of the word shofu, the second character of which translates as “women.” The bill, then, concentrated on punishment, applying the same penalty equally to the client and to the provider. It did not provide for rehabilitation, either through the court system or through welfare institutions. (p.104)

As long as prostitution was defined as a women’s issue and female politicians were themselves divided, there was little prospect for passing a national law prohibiting the practice. There were too many vested interests supporting it, and Allied authorities, also divided, would not insist on such a measure. The 1948 bill failed in committee. It was not until the end of censorship in 1949 and a new surge of foreign troops with the onset of the Korean War in 1950 that Japanese discontent with base prostitution burst out into the open. A coalition then began to form that could pass national legislation. (p.106)

In October 1955, after the Matsumoto Incident, July’s close vote in the Diet, and the ensuing bribery allegations, Hatoyama ordered the establishment of a new body, the Prostitution Countermeasure Council (Baishun Taisaku Shingikai), to prepare more politically appealing anti-prostitution legislation. When the council submitted its report in April 1956, it stressed two key points. One was that the act of prostitution itself should not be the subject of criminal procedure. Instead, it recommended punishing solicitation and procurement—in other words, the public acts that endangered public morals. Second, the report devoted an entire section to the rehabilitation of convicted sex workers. Its recommendations consisted mainly of the establishment of women’s consultation offices (fujin sōdansho) and women’s protective facilities (fujin hogo shisetsu). (p.128)

Their fervent desire for a bill against prostitution forced compromise, and the first national Prostitution Prevention Bill passed the Diet and was issued as law No. 118 on May 24, 1956. The law went into effect on April 1, 1957. The penal provisions followed one year later. (p.136)

売春防止法が成立した一因は世論の変化にあります。米兵に群がるパンパンに不快感をもつ人たちが増え、その多くが子供の教育に与える悪影響を危惧し、売春規制を支持するようになります。
By 1953, most Japanese were aware of military-base sex workers, according to a survey by the Women and Minors Bureau. Sixty percent felt antipathy toward them, and only 21 percent sympathized with their situation. Their aversion derived in large measure from protective feelings about Japanese children. When asked what harmful influences sex workers might cause, 33 percent cited children’s education, and 21 percent pointed to other related factors, such as negative moral influences on young girls. Such results suggest that many, if not most, Japanese men and women considered the primary ill effects of the military-base sex workers to be the creation of an undesirable moral climate or more specific harm to (full-blooded) Japanese children. In the early 1950s, after censorship lifted, intellectuals, Christian activists, and Diet members played to these concerns in making a case to Japanese women that anti-prostitution legislation was essential to their wellbeing and that of their families. (p.71)

But by 1955, the terms of the debate were shifting, to the point that some kind of national anti-prostitution law was becoming inevitable. Sex work, once seen as a necessary evil, or even as a sign of family sacrifice, was now thought to threaten public morals and endanger children. Under the Allied Occupation, streetwalking had increased dramatically. Panpan plied their trade in residential neighborhoods and worked near schools. Base towns became dependent on sex workers and the dollars they earned. But even traditional red-light districts began to seem depraved. In 1949, 70 percent of those polled were in favor of preserving the red-light districts. In 1953, the number had dropped to 37 percent. When another survey in 1957 asked about their impact on society, only 16 percent believed it was positive. (p.124)

そして、売春防止法支持に動いた議員たちは外圧を利用します。彼等は国連に加盟するためには日本「も」売春行為を禁止しなければならないと強く主張します。
Proponents began to press the argument that Japan could not be a member of the international community in good standing until it outlawed prostitution. It was a sensitive point for the Japanese government. Japan had long sought international recognition and had been active in the League of Nations before withdrawing in 1933 over the League’s challenge to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria. After signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, entry to the United Nations was an essential step on the road to readmission to the international community. Japan first applied to join the UN in 1953, but its request, subject to Security Council approval, was rejected by the Soviets. (p.116)

Japan was just one of many countries denied UN membership because of Cold War competition. But women’s groups—many in close contact with their counterparts abroad—argued that the country could improve its credentials by conforming to international norms. Conversely, Fujita Taki, chair of the Women and Minors Bureau of the Ministry of Labor—whose father, a Nagoya judge, had rendered the judgment making advance money invalid in 1900—claimed that joining the UN would improve women’s status. At issue was the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. Adopted in 1949 and entering into force in 1951, the treaty would require Japan to criminalize prostitution. (p.116)

In June 1955, Kamichika Ichiko argued before the House of Councillors Judicial Committee that most democratic nations had anti-prostitution legislation and the UN had passed a resolution prohibiting forced labor and earning money from prostitution. She argued that if Japan was to become a member of the United Nations in the near future, it had to pass antiprostitution legislation. Two days later, in the House of Representatives, she insisted once again that keeping prostitution legal would become a major obstacle in Japan’s path toward gaining an honorable position in the international community and realizing the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In a roundtable in Fujin Koron a year earlier, Kamichika had referenced Eleanor Roosevelt’s visit to Japan and her criticism of Japan’s lack of a legal prohibition against prostitution. Activist abolitionist Itō Hidekichi agreed: in July 1955, in testimony before the Committee on Judicial Affairs of the House, he argued that if Japan joined the UN, it had a responsibility to adhere to the 1949 Convention. (pp.116-7)

Time and again, Diet members such as Kamichika Ichiko and Fujiwara Michiko would drive home the same point: Japan’s failure to outlaw prostitution was an international embarrassment. To that end, Kamichika suggested that Japan was under investigation. In fact, in this period the UN depended on self-reporting when it surveyed sex work. And in the case of Japan, it blamed Allied servicemen, suggesting that their presence had delayed social development. Nevertheless, the UN’s reporting helped abolitionists shame politicians. (p.117)

Kamichika declared that it was embarrassing for Japan to find itself in the same category as Turkey and Costa Rica, which also allowed licensed prostitution. Japan, Kamichika argued, was far behind other Asian countries in recognizing women’s rights. Other Asian representatives were astonished, she said, when she had to acknowledge that Japan still had not passed a prostitution punishment bill. Fujiwara Michiko said that she was ashamed in Jakarta when someone asked her, “Do you keep silent when newspapers in the world reported that Japan has been a country of prostitution for hundreds of years?” (p.117)

しかし、対外的には建前上、売春を禁止すればよいだけであって、売春防止法成立後も売春行為は存続します。
The argument that Japan had to outlaw prostitution for the sake of its international reputation had important implications. International conventions, after all, had long discriminated between women as more or less deserving of protection, above all white women who had been trafficked, as opposed to women who lived under colonial rule. And these conventions were concerned only with the legal status of sex work, ignoring whether and how these laws were enforced. Shaming the national leadership was rhetorically effective, but it also conveyed the message that the issue was one of appearance. Rather than address the reality of sex work, it helped convince them that it had to be driven underground. (p.118)

ちなみに日本の売春制度を語る時に必ず出てくるのが戦中の従軍慰安婦です。本書は従軍慰安婦に関してとくに議論していませんが、いくつか言及しているところはあります。従軍慰安婦についてはsex slaveryという言葉も使っていますし、かなり厳しく見ているようです。
On the subject of sex work, the perception of remaining under U.S. occupation pervades the accounts offered by most Japanese historians. Yuki Tanaka, for example, compares the panpan to the military comfort women in wartime Asia. He points to the way Japanese authorities set up brothels in both cases, as well as the similarities in the predatory and racist behavior of servicemen. (p.6)

Selling sex may not have been the first choice of many women. But it needs to be understood in relation to their immediate economic and other interests. If only for lack of good options, they voluntarily participated and were paid for their efforts, unlike the Korean and Chinese women who were enslaved by the Japanese military. (p.8)

But the most important new development of the wartime period was not the beginning of more informal, less regulated forms of sex work, nor was it the first sign of a de facto coalition of anti-prostitution activists and brothel owners to stop such practices. Instead, it was the creation of a vast system of sexual slavery establishments for the Japanese military. Unwitting women from countries including Korea and China, as well as interned Dutch civilians, found themselves compelled to provide sexual services to Japanese servicemen, enduring the most appalling conditions. Estimates vary, since so much of the official record was destroyed, but as many as 200,000 women may have been consigned to this fate. In this way, the military hoped to control sexual violence against occupied peoples and contain the spread of VD in the ranks. (p.14)

Beginning in 1933, the Japanese military overseas turned to more authoritarian methods to organize sexual services while also containing disease. They established what they called comfort stations, which, in fact, became sites of sexual slavery. Although many Japanese sex workers volunteered to go to the front—they may have either had little taste for factory labor or suffered from onerous debts—few likely understood the conditions they would face. And there is no question that women from Korea, China, the Netherlands, and elsewhere were forced to serve. The organizers intended the system not only to contain the spread of VD but also to reduce the incidence of attacks on civilians in China. Rapes occurred as early as the first Shanghai Incident in 1932, and on a larger scale with all-out war in 1937. This experience overseas led Japanese officials to fear that occupying forces would engage in mass rapes of Japanese women, so they took it upon themselves to organize comfort stations for U.S. troops. (pp.21-22)

No one was more culpable than those military and government officials who organized forced sexual labor through comfort stations during the Pacific War, and those who established brothels as a “bulwark” to protect middle-class Japanese women against rape by Allied ser vicemen. Though women may have had the most to lose, especially in an occupied territory, rape in wartime was also intended to punish husbands, brothers, and fathers. Occupation officials, for their part, were mainly concerned with protecting their own troops against infection, even though Allied servicemen came to Japan with appallingly high rates of syphilis and gonorrhea, and played a major role in starting the postwar epidemic. (p.153)

3月 9, 2014 · Pukuro · No Comments
Posted in: ☆日本問題

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