ハイデガーの反ユダヤ主義: 『黒ノート』出版をめぐって


Gregory Fried, “What Heidegger Was Hiding: Unearthing the Philosopher’s Anti-Semitism,” Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2014).

著者のGregory Fried氏はボストン市にあるサフォーク大学哲学部の学部長を務めています。彼はハイデガーに関する著作・論文を多数執筆しています。

A Companion to Heidegger`s “Introduction to Metaphysics”
Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics
“Heidegger and Gandhi: A Dialogue on Conflict and Enmity,” forthcoming in In The Wake of Conflict: Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation, Allen Speight and Alice MacLachan eds. (Springer).
“Back to the Cave: A Platonic Rejoinder to Heidegger,” in Drew Hyland and John P. Manoussakis (eds.), Heidegger and the Greeks (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
“On Heidegger’s Etymology and Grammar of the Verb ‘To Be’ in Introduction to Metaphysics,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (Yale University Press: 2001).

ハイデガーの『存在と時間(Sein und Zeit)』の英訳もしています。



ナチス党がドイツの政権を掌握した1933年の4月21日、ハイデッガーはフライブルク大学総長に選出された。5月1日の「国民的労働の日」をもって、22名の同僚教授とともにナチス党に入党した。5月27日の就任式典では就任演説『ドイツ大学の自己主張』(Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität)を行い、ナチ党員としてナチス革命を賞賛し、大学をナチス革命の精神と一致させるよう訴えた。またこの式典ではナチス党歌「旗を高く掲げよ」が演奏され、ナチス式敬礼を非党員にも強要して物議をかもしている。10月1日にはフライブルク大学の「指導者」に任命され、大学の「強制的同一化」を推進した。また国際連盟脱退やヒトラーの国家元首就任を支持する演説も行うなど、学外でもアクティブな活動を行った。フライブルク大学の同僚で世界的な化学者であったヘルマン・シュタウディンガーや、かつて自分の友人であったエドヴァルト・バウムガルテンドイツ語版)の密告も行っている。しかしハイデッガーの「改革」は大学内に内紛をもたらし、混乱を収拾できなくなったハイデッガーは1934年4月23日に総長を辞任した。




ハイデガーの反ユダヤ主義に関する論文が今年になって数多く出ています。彼の『黒ノート』が刊行しはじめたからです。『黒ノート』とはハイデガーがメモを記したノートのことです。表紙が黒だから黒ノートというわけです。1930年代初めから1970年代初めまでの約40年間書き記しています。FriedがForeign Affairsでドイツで出版されたPeter TrawnyHeidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung (Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy)のレビューを書いていますが、FriedとTrawnyの結論は、ハイデガーの反ナチス主義は彼の存在論と深く関わっているという事です。

Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung (Heidegger and the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy). BY PETER TRAWNY. Klostermann, 2014, 124 pp. €15.80.

He [Heidegger] had concealed his antisemitism from the Nazi’s themselves. Why? Because he was of the opinion, that his antisemitism was different from that of the Nazis. That is certainly right. Nevertheless—care is recommended here.
—Peter Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der Jüdischen Weltverschworung (Heidegger and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy), 15-16

In other words we must ask: How should we proceed with Heidegger’s being-historical antisemitism in relation to the Shoa? It is no longer open to debate whether Heidegger’s “political error” ought to be defended (if that is possible) against a “politically correct” and thus intentionally or unintentionally distorting public debate. There is antisemtism in Heidegger’s thinking that—as corresponds to a thinker—receives a (impossible) philosophic ground. But this antisemitism of Heidegger’s does not go beyond two or three stereotypes. The being-historical construction makes it however worse. The being-historical construction can lead to a contamination of Heidegger’s thinking.
—Peter Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der Jüdischen Weltverschworung (Heidegger and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy), 93.

To his new champions, Heidegger portrayed himself as the typical unworldly philosopher, claiming that he had joined the Nazi Party and accepted Freiburg’s rectorate primarily to defend higher education from the worst excesses of the regime. He insisted that he had quickly realized his mistake, which led him to resign as rector less than a year into his term and start including veiled critiques of the Nazis in his subsequent lectures and writings.

The official story began to wear thin in the 1980s, however, when two scholars, Hugo Ott and Victor Farías, using newly uncovered documents, each challenged Heidegger’s claim that his brush with Nazism had been a form of reluctant accommodation. More recently, in 2005, the French philosopher Emmanuel Faye drew on newly discovered seminar transcripts from the Nazi period to argue that Heidegger’s thinking was inherently fascist even before Hitler’s rise to power. Faye accused the French Heideggerians of having orchestrated a cover-up of Heidegger’s political extremism and advocated banishing Heidegger’s work from the field of philosophy; no one, Faye said, should associate the greatest barbarism of the twentieth century with the West’s most exalted tradition of reason and enlightenment. In response, Heidegger’s defenders labeled Faye’s textual interpretations tendentious and resorted to a variation on Heidegger’s old argument: that he had quickly grasped his error and realized that Nazism was nothing more than hubristic nihilism. Still, it was hard to explain away the depth of commitment that Faye had uncovered.


そして、真打の登場です。『黒ノート』の編者でもある、ベルク大学ヴッパータールのMartin Heidegger Institute所長のPeter Trawnyが詳細な『黒ノート』分析を通じて、新著でハイデガーの反ユダヤ主義を暴き出します。ハイデガーはナチへの協力を示した1933年の翌年にはナチスと距離を置き始めます。それは政治的活動にナイーブだったためにナチスに加入したが、ナチスの危険思想に次第に気づいたためでと説明されてきました。Trawnyはそうではないと主張します。ハイデガーの反ユダヤ主義は彼の哲学から導き出されたものであり、ナチスから離れていったのはナチスの反ユダヤ主義がかれの反ユダヤ主義に沿わなかったからだと。
Trawny’s new book caused a sensation among Heidegger scholars even before it appeared in print, in large part because several inflammatory passages quoted from the notebooks, previously unpublished and containing clearly anti-Semitic content, were leaked from the page proofs. But with the book now released, Trawny’s novel line of analysis is creating its own stir. Drawing on the new material, Trawny makes two related arguments: first, that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism was deeply entwined with his philosophical ideas and, second, that it was distinct from that of the Nazis. Trawny deals with the notebooks that Heidegger composed in 1931–41, which include the years after he resigned as rector of the University of Freiburg, in 1934. As the notebooks make clear, Heidegger was far from an unthinking Nazi sympathizer. Rather, he was deeply committed to his own philosophical form of anti-Semitism — one he felt the Nazis failed to live up to.

It is hard to exaggerate just how ambitious Heidegger was in publishing his breakout work, Being and Time, in 1927. In that book, he sought nothing less than a redefinition of what it meant to be human, which amounted to declaring war on the entire philosophical tradition that preceded him. Western thought, Heidegger argued, had taken a wrong turn beginning with Plato, who had located the meaning of being in the timeless, unchanging realm of ideas. In Plato’s view, the world as humans knew it was like a cave; its human inhabitants could perceive only the shadows of true ideals that lay beyond. Plato was thus responsible for liberalism in the broadest sense: the notion that transcendent, eternal norms gave meaning to the mutable realm of human affairs. Today, modern liberals call those rules universal values, natural laws, or human rights.

But for Heidegger, there was no transcendence and no Platonic God — no escape, in effect, from the cave. Meaning lay not in serving abstract ideals but in confronting one’s place within the cave itself: in how individuals and peoples inhabited their finite existence through time. Heidegger’s conception of human being required belonging to a specific, shared historical context or national identity. Platonic universalism undermined such collective forms of contingent, historical identity. In the eyes of a transcendent God or natural law, all people — whether Germans, Russians, or Jews — were essentially the same. As Heidegger put it in a 1933 lecture at Freiburg: “If one interprets [Plato’s] ideas as representations and thoughts that contain a value, a norm, a law, a rule, such that ideas then become conceived of as norms, then the one subject to these norms is the human being — not the historical human being, but rather the human being in general.” It was against this rootless, “general” conception of humanity, Heidegger told his students, that “we must struggle.”

By “we,” Heidegger meant Germany under Hitler’s National Socialist regime, which he hoped would play a central role in such an effort. Heidegger followed in a long line of German intellectuals, going as far back as the eighteenth century, who believed that the country was destined to play a transformative role in human history — a kind of modern rejoinder to the creative glory of ancient Greece. For Heidegger, this meant replacing the old, Platonic order with one grounded in his vision of historical being. In the early 1930s, he came to see Hitler’s National Socialist movement, with its emphasis on German identity, as the best chance of bringing about such a revolutionary change. And in the Jews, he saw a shared enemy.

As Trawny’s title suggests, both Hitler’s and Heidegger’s view of the Jews grew out of a particular form of German anti-Semitism that was rampant after World War I. This strain of thinking, which saw Jews as part of a monolithic, transnational conspiracy, was crystallized in “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” a forged document that first appeared in Russia in 1903 and made its way to Germany in 1920. Originally published by Russian monarchists to scapegoat the Jews for the tsar’s military defeats and the subsequent upheaval, the protocols purported to be minutes from a series of meetings held by Jewish leaders bent on world domination. According to the alleged transcript, the plotters sought to manipulate international finance, culture, and media; promote extreme ideas and radical political movements; and foment war to destabilize existing powers. Hitler devoured the tract, which he swiftly employed as Nazi propaganda. It hit a nerve in Germany, still traumatized by World War I, beset by economic chaos, and subject to extreme political instability — all of which could now be attributed to the Jews.

Trawny does not argue that Heidegger read the protocols or agreed with all their contentions. Rather, he suggests that like so many other Germans, Heidegger accepted their basic premise, which Hitler hammered home in his speeches and in Nazi propaganda. As evidence, Trawny cites the German philosopher and Heidegger colleague Karl Jaspers, who recalled in his memoir a conversation he had with Heidegger in 1933. When Jaspers brought up “the vicious nonsense about the Elders of Zion,” Heidegger reportedly expressed his genuine concern: “But there is a dangerous international alliance of the Jews,” he replied.

Yet Hitler and Heidegger embraced anti-Semitic conspiracy theories for different reasons. Whereas the former argued that the Jews posed a racial threat (a fear for which the protocols offered evidence), the latter saw them as a philosophical one. The Jews, as uprooted nomads serving a transcendent God — albeit sometimes through their secular activities — embodied the very tradition that Heidegger wanted to overturn. Moreover, as Trawny points out, Heidegger found race deeply problematic. He did not dismiss the concept altogether; if understood as a biological feature of a particular people, race might well inform that people’s historical trajectory. But he rejected using race as the primary determinant of identity. For Heidegger, racism was itself a function of misguided metaphysical thinking, because it presumed a biological, rather than historical, interpretation of what it meant to be human. By “fastening” people into “equally divided arrangement,” he wrote in the notebooks, racism went “hand in hand with a self-alienation of peoples — the loss of history.” Instead of obsessing over racial distinctions, Germans needed to confront their identity as an ongoing philosophical question. Heidegger overtly criticized the Nazis for their fixation on biological identity, but he also lambasted the Jews for the same sin. “The Jews,” he wrote in the notebooks, “have already been ‘living’ for the longest time according to the principle of race.”

Heidegger’s anti-Semitism differed from that of the typical Nazi in other important ways. To many of Hitler’s supporters, for example, the protocols reinforced the view that the Jews were essentially un-German, incapable of properly integrating with Germany’s way of life or even understanding its spirit. But Heidegger took this notion further, arguing that the Jews belonged truly nowhere. “For a Slavic people, the nature of our German space would definitely be revealed differently from the way it is revealed to us,” Heidegger told his students in a 1934 seminar. “To Semitic nomads, it will perhaps never be revealed at all.” Moreover, Heidegger said, history had shown that “nomads have also often left wastelands behind them where they found fruitful and cultivated land.” By this logic, the Jews were rootless; lacking a proper home, all they had was allegiance to one another.

Another anxiety reflected in the protocols and in Hitler’s propaganda concerned the perceived power of this stateless, conspiratorial Jewry — be it in banking, finance, or academia. But for Heidegger, the success of Europe’s Jews was a symptom of a broader philosophical problem. Playing on the tired cliché of Jews as clever with abstractions and calculation, the notebooks make a more general critique of modern society: “The temporary increase in the power of Jewry has its basis in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, served as the hub for the spread of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative skill, which in this way lodged itself in the ‘spirit.’”

In forgetting what it meant to be finite and historical, in other words, the West had become obsessed with mastering and controlling beings — a tendency Heidegger called “machination,” or the will to dominate nature in all its forms, ranging from raw materials to human beings themselves. And with their “calculative skill,” the Jews had thrived in this distorted “spirit” of the modern age.

At the same time, the Jews were not, in Heidegger’s view, merely passive beneficiaries of Western society’s “empty rationality” and liberal ideology; they were active proponents of them. “The role of world Jewry,” Heidegger wrote in the notebooks, was a “metaphysical question about the kind of humanity that, without any restraints, can take over the uprooting of all beings from Being as its world-historical ‘task.’” Even if the Jews could not be blamed for the introduction of Platonism or for its hold over Western society, they were the chief carriers of its “task.” By asserting liberal rights to demand inclusion in such nations as Germany, the Jews were estranging those countries’ citizens from their humanity — the shared historical identity that made them distinct from other peoples. This reasoning formed the basis for a truly poisonous hostility toward the Jews, and it was perhaps Heidegger’s most damning judgment of them. Now that the notebooks have come into the light, however, such passages constitute the most damning evidence against the philosopher himself.

So what did Heidegger think should be done about the Jews? Did he agree with the Nazi policies? The notebooks give readers little to go on; Heidegger seems to have had no taste for detailed policy discussions. Nevertheless, the philosopher spoke through his silence. Despite his criticism of the Nazis and their crude biological racism, he wrote nothing against Hitler’s laws targeting the Jews. Although Heidegger resigned as rector of Freiburg before Hitler passed the Nuremberg Laws, which classified German citizens according to race, he had assumed the role in 1933, just after the Nazis enacted their first anti-Jewish codes, which excluded Jews from civil service and university posts (and which Heidegger helped implement). During a lecture in the winter of 1933–34, he warned a hall full of students that “the enemy can have attached itself to the innermost roots” of the people and that they, the German students, must be prepared to attack such an enemy “with the goal of total annihilation.” Heidegger did not specify “the enemy,” but for the Nazis, they included Germany’s communists; its Roma, or Gypsies; and, above all, its Jews. This chilling prefiguration of Hitler’s Final Solution is unmistakable, and Heidegger never explained, let alone apologized for, such horrendous statements.

Trawny ends his analysis by arguing that the anti-Semitism of the notebooks will require a thorough reevaluation of Heidegger’s thought, and he is right. Even if, as Trawny is at pains to remind his readers, the notebooks show that Heidegger became increasingly critical of the Nazis as early as 1933, they also demonstrate just how firmly his anti-Semitism was rooted in his philosophical ideas.



公益財団法人日独文化研究所 学術交流「ペーター・トラヴニー(Peter Trawny)氏講演会


ニューヨーク州バード大学のハンナ・アレントセンターでの講演 (April 8, 2014)
Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: A discussion with Peter Trawny and Roger Berkowitz
Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: A Panel Discussion with Peter Trawny and Babette Babich, moderated by Roger Berkowitz

Collegezalencomplex Radboud Universityでの講演 (September 17, 2014)
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『黒ノート』発刊後のハイデガー解釈はさまざまです。Peter TrawnyやGregory Friedのように彼の反ユダヤ主義はハイデガー哲学から導き出されたものであると主張する者もいれば、相互の関連性を認めない人もいます。

Heidegger’s ‘black notebooks’ reveal antisemitism at core of his philosophy by Philip Oltermann (March 13, 2014)

The New YorkerのJoshua Rothmanの記事がよく書かれています。
Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism? (April 28, 2014)

The passages, some of which were written during the Second World War, account for only a few pages out of more than a thousand. But they have alarmed and disgusted Heideggerians because they show that Heidegger himself had no trouble using his own philosophy for anti-Semitic ends. Philosophy has a math-like quality: it’s not just a vocabulary, but a system. A failure in one part of the system can suggest a failure everywhere. And so, earlier this year, in a book called “Heidegger and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy,” Trawny asked the inevitable question: could Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole be “contaminated” by Nazism?

Trawnyのことをハイデガーのjudgeではなくて、disappointed loverと評しています。
Because Trawny was from Germany, no one knew what he would be like in person—an incomprehensible hermeneutist? A cool judge of history? He turned out to be a tall, disarming man of fifty who sounded less like a judge than a disappointed lover. In a soft German accent, he explained what it had been like to read the notebooks for the first time. “Of course, you have passages about Hölderlin, about Nietzsche, about Bolshevism,” he said—the usual Heideggerian subjects. “But then, suddenly, a passage about the Jews.… You think, Okay, whatever.… And then suddenly you have the second, and you have the third, and you have the fourth, and you have the sixth, and you think, What the hell! Why is he doing this?” As a lifelong Heideggerian, reading and publishing these passages had been “very painful,” Trawny said; it had also introduced all sorts of practical complications into his life. “I’m the director of the Martin Heidegger Institute, and I actually want to be that for a longer time,” he said, to laughter from the audience. (“You cannot be the director of the Adolf Hitler Institute,” a colleague had warned him.) He went on, “If we would say that Heidegger really was an anti-Semitic philosopher, then, yeah, that would be really a catastrophe, in a certain way, for me.” This was true, to varying degrees, for many in the room. It was good to hear someone admit that the controversy wasn’t a matter of purely intellectual interest.

The New Yorkerのもう一つの記事もお読みください。
Why Does It Matter If Heidegger Was Anti-Semitic? by Richard Brody (March 27, 2014)

ハンナ・アレントセンターのHeidegger, Being Human, and Antisemitismも参照のこと。
Heidegger worried that humans too often forget this meaningful difference and treat humans as mere things, as simply means to greater ends. While this has always been so, it is especially true in the modern age, the age in which all beings, including human beings, are increasingly viewed and valued only for their usefulness.

Heidegger’s analysis of the Mississippi applies to human beings as well. What are human beings today? We are human resources, to be maximized and organized. We educate human beings so that they can be productive. We care for them so that they live comfortably and cost less to care for later. Human capital is only one form of capital amongst others, but it requires intense management and care to be efficiently managed. Of course, when a dam is needed, humans may need to be uprooted and moved. Certain dangerous humans need to be medicated. And other violent humans can be tempered by implants in their brains. In times of disorder, humans must be restrained; in times of sickness they may need to be culled; and in times of war they may need to be eliminated. In short, humans are increasingly treated and acted upon as resources just as things. Which is one reason we have such difficulty thinking about the study of the humanities outside of questions of utility. In another vein, Heidegger’s philosophy offers one of truly meaningful defenses of the dignity of humanity that might provide a ground for human rights.

It is thus all the more surprising and shocking that Heidegger was an unapologetic Nazi and an antisemite.

Heideggers “Black Notebooks”: Crude Conspiracy Theories by Dirk Pilz
Heidegger’s Notebooks Renew Focus on Anti-Semitism by Jennifer Schuessler (March 30, 2014)

In defence of Heidegger by Jonathan Rée (March 12, 2014)
Heidegger’s Black Notebooks: The Diaries of a Dissident National Socialist by Greg Johnson (March 26, 2014)

まだ聞いていませんが、哲学史家のTom Rockmoreも講演でハイデガーの『黒ノート』をとりあげています。
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11月 26, 2014 · Pukuro · No Comments
Posted in: ☆哲学と倫理

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