リアリズムが国際政治学をダメにした: ハンス・J・モーゲンソウの場合 1-3



アメリカの国際政治学者John A. Vasquez1999年に出版したThe Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge University Press)を読了しました。

The Power of Power Politics


John A. Vasquez

本書は1983年に出版された The Power of Power Politics: A Critique の改訂版です。Introduction, Part I, Part II3つで構成されています。Part I1983年版の原稿をそのまま転載しています。Part Iではとくにハンス・モーゲンソウ(Hans J. Morgenthau)の『国際政治─権力と平和』(Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace)をテキストに使い、リアリズム批判をおこなっています。Part II1979年に出版されたケネス・ウォルツ(Kennth N. Waltz)の『国際政治の理論』(Theory of International Politics)を中心にウォルツ以後のリアリストの動向を分析しながらリアリズム批判をしています。今回はPart Iの第1章と第2章をみてみます。Part Iは以下の構成になっています。

Part I: The Original Text: Classical Realism and Quantitative International Politics
1. The role of paradigms in scientific inquiry: a conceptual framework and a set of principles for paradigm evaluation
2. The role of the realist paradigm in the development of a scientific study of international relations
3. Research design: defining and operationalizing the realist paradigm
4. Theory construction as a paradigm-directed activity
5. Data making as a paradigm-directed activity
6. Research as a paradigm-directed activity
7. Evaluation: the adequacy of the realist paradigm
8. Theory and research in the 1970s: the emerging anomalies


This book will seek to demonstrate two controversial claims: that the realist paradigm has dominated the field of international relations since the early 1950s, and that this paradigm has not been very successful in explaining behavior. (p.13)



第1章: 科学的探究におけるパラダイムの役割 ─ パラダイム評価のための概念的枠組みと一連の原則



The concept of paradigm, then, could be stipulatively defined as the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are studying. These assumptions provide answers to the questions that must be addressed before theorizing even begins. For Kuhn, as Masterman (1970: 62) points out, such questions are: What are the fundamental units of which the world is composed? How do these units interact with each other? What interesting questions may be asked about these units? What kinds of conceptions will provide answers to these inquiries? By responding to these questions, the fundamental assumptions form a picture of the world the scholar is studying and tell the scholar what is known about the world, what is unknown about it, how one should view the world if one wants to know the unknown, and finally what is worth knowing. (pp.23-3)

A paradigm consists of a set of fundamental assumptions of the world. These assumptions focus the attention of the scholar on certain phenomena and interpret those phenomena via concepts. Propositions, in turn, are developed by specifying relationships between concepts. Finally, theories are developed by specifying relationships between propositions. (p.24)


On the basis of this analysis, it can be stipulated that a paradigm only changes when its fundamental assumptions or view of the world changes. “New” concepts, propositions, or theories that do not change the assumptions of the paradigm do not constitute new paradigms, but only the elaborations, or what Kuhn (1970a: 24, 33-34) calls articulations, of the old one. (p.24)

Normal science begins to come to an end when an anomaly – “the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations” – is unable to be removed by paradigm articulation (Kuhn 1970a: 52-53). The persistence of the anomaly(ies) results in a crisis in the field. Crisis is met by devising “numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of … theory in order to eliminate any conflict” between fact and theory (Kuhn 1970a: 78). However, if the anomaly can be accounted for only by seeing the world in a new and different way (i.e., by the creation of a new paradigm), then the stage is set for a struggle between the adherents of the competing paradigms (Kuhn 1970a: 53, ch. 10). If the struggle results in the displacement of the old paradigm and the dominance of the new paradigm, then this period is viewed with hindsight as a period of scientific discovery and revolution. New textbooks rewrite the history of the field, students are trained to see the world according to the new paradigm, and the process repeats itself. (p.26)


Kuhn (1970a: 146-148) has attempted to show that Popper’s rule is simply not followed in the physical sciences. Theories and the paradigms out of which they arise do not stipulate what will count as falsifying evidence. Furthermore, when falsifying evidence is encountered, it does not lead to a rejection of the paradigm. Finally, according to Kuhn no paradigm has ever been “rejected” unless there is a competing paradigm ready to take its place. Popper’s (1970: 52-53, 56-58) response is not that this does not occur, but that it need not necessarily occur and will not if scientists are trained properly. What most of the debate has been about, then, is how to confirm competing theories that may emerge from competing paradigms and their research programs. (pp.29-30)


In social science, particularly in international relations inquiry, the problem of evaluating paradigms turns not so much on comparing the corroborated empirical content of rival theories and their research program but on finding any theory with a corroborated content of any significance. Since a paradigm is used to produce theories, it is possible to evaluate the adequacy of a paradigm in terms of the corroborated hypotheses it produces. This is the basic criterion that will be used here to evaluate paradigms. However, as Lakatos suggests, applying this criterion is a matter of decision. How many corroborated hypotheses must there be? How much paradigm-directed research must there be, and for how long must this research continue before a paradigm can be declared inadequate? All of these are unanswered questions in the field of international relations. But it does seem reasonable to assume that if various theories and hypotheses produced by the use of a paradigm fail over time to produce a significant number of findings, the problem may very well be that the picture of the world being used by scholars is simply inadequate. If the science of international relations is to be systematic, it is incumbent upon scholars to examine periodically what paradigm (if any) is dominating the field and to evaluate its usefulness in the terms outlined. In a discipline where there are very few corroborated hypotheses, there will always be disagreements over whether a paradigm and its research program are useful. But attempts at evaluation are important because they provide empirical evidence that scholars can use to come to a rational conclusion. As more research is conducted and more evaluations of it are made, a trend may become clear and the disagreements will probably subside. It is in this spirit that the present evaluation is offered. (p.31)

第2章: 国際関係の科学的研究の発展におけるリアリスト・パラダイムの役割

第2章ではトマス・クーンの科学論に基づき、第二次世界大戦をきっかけに国際政治学で理想主義パラダイム(idealist paradigm)から現実主義パラダイムへのパラダイムシフトがあったこと、1950終わり頃に登場し、1960年代から1970年代にかけて流行した行動科学主義(behavioralism)は現実主義パラダイムに対抗するものではなかったことが示されています。

The resulting analysis shows how the idealist paradigm helped institutionalize the discipline and instill it with purpose, how the anomaly of World War II led to the displacement of the idealist paradigm and to the dominance of the realist paradigm, and how the behavioral revolt did not change the paradigm of the field but provided a conception of scientific methodology. (p.32)

国際政治学というディシプリンは第一次世界大戦をきっかけに生まれます。最初に登場したのが理想主義パラダイムです。この辺りについてはE. H. カーの『危機の二十年』をお読みください。

The twentieth-century history of international relations inquiry can be roughly divided into three stages: the idealist phase; the realist tradition; and the “behavioral” revolt (see Bull 1972: 33). The first stage of international relations inquiry was dominated by the idealist paradigm. The immediate origins of this paradigm stemmed from the experience of World War I and the belief that such a conflagration could and must be avoided in the future (Kirk 1947: 3-4; Fox 1949: 68). Its fundamental belief was that by using reason, humans could overcome such problems as war (Carr 1939 [1964: 25-27]; Dunn 1949: 81). All humans were seen as having a common interest that formed a “nascent world community” (Wolters 1951 [1962: 86]). Given a basic harmony of interest among all people, a system of peace could be established under the proper conditions. The scholar’s purpose was to reveal this fundamental truth and to delineate those conditions so that it would be possible to establish a set of institutions that by their very structure would force nations to act peacefully and thereby cause a revolution in the way international politics was conducted (Carr 1939 [1964: 27-31]). (p.33)


The best-known intellectual force behind this paradigm was, of course, Woodrow Wilson, and his specific theory of democracy as the cause of peace and dictatorship as the cause of war formed the heart of the paradigm. According to this theory, the masses never benefit from war, and with proper enlightenment they will realize this. Through education and contact with others, ignorance and prejudice would be eliminated. Through the spread of democracy, the masses would prevent sinister interests from promulgating wars. Finally, the institutions that prevented violence at the domestic level could be created at the global level to resolve disputes nonviolently. These ideas were embodied in the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and in the emphasis on international law, arbitration, disarmament, collective security, and peaceful change (Fox 1949: 74-75). Together, these theory-laden beliefs constituted a research program for idealist scholars. (pp.33-4)


Wilson’s ideas were widely shared by others in the United Kingdom and the United States and adopted by a group of scholars whose conscious purpose was the investigation of the major tenets of the paradigm in order to better promote its normative goals. They attempted to create an analytical model of a system characterized by peace and then to show how the present world system deviated from that model (Fox 1949: 77; Dunn 1949: 93). Among the major scholars sharing this paradigm were Alfred Zimmern, S. H. Bailey, Philip Noel-Baker, and David Mitrany of the United Kingdom and James T. Shotwell, Pitman Potter, and Parker T. Moon of the United States (Bull 1972: 34). (p.34)


Inquiry under this paradigm was of two kinds: historical and legal-institutional. The historical aspect at times emphasized the “mistakes” of history in the hope that rational knowledge of these mistakes would prevent their reoccurrence. James Bryce’s International Relations (1922) was one of the popular texts of the time and reflected this historical emphasis (Fox 1949: 75-76; W. Olson 1972:19). Knowledge of the past was only part of the answer to the problem of peace. If history provided a negative example, the study of international organization was to provide the positive example. Since the idealist paradigm guided scholars toward a normative and prescriptive analysis, the study of international organization consisted of the role international institutions should and could play in establishing an era of peace (Kirk 1947: 4-5). The best reflection of this view was Alfred Zimmern’s The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (1936). The dominance of the paradigm is reflected by the fact that the two most popular approaches to teaching international politics in the United States during the interwar period were current events and diplomatic history and international law and organization (Thompson 1952). In addition, there was a strong emphasis on interdisciplinary study, including anthropology, sociology, economics, demography, geography, law, psychology, and even animal behavior (see Kirk 1947:14-21). (p.34)


Since the idealists tested their “theories” not in the laboratory but in the real world, by attempting to guide policy, the anomaly that led to a scientific crisis and eventual displacement of the paradigm was the inability of international law and organization to prevent World War II (see Kirk 1947: 6-7; Fox 1949: 67-68).

リアリストの先駆者はフレデリック・シューマン、ハロルド・ニコルソン、E. H. カー、ラインホルド・ニーバー、ジョーグ・シュワルツェンベルガー、ニコラス・スパイクマン、マーティン・ワイト、ハンス・モーゲンソウ、ジョージ・ケナン、ハーバート・バターフィールドら。

Others besides Carr were reacting to the same events, and it was these other writers along with Carr who began to develop the realist paradigm. These leading writers and their most influential works were: Frederick Schuman, International Politics (1933); Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (1939); E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939); Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (1940); Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (1941); Nicholas Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (1942); Martin Wight, Power Politics (1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (1951); and Herbert Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War (1953). (pp.35-6)

その中でも、ハンス・モーゲンソウのPolitics Among Nations (1948年出版、その後何度も改訂)が現実主義パラダイムの「模範例」(exemplar)となったと著者は主張します。

Hans J. Morgenthau best expressed, promulgated, and synthesized the work of these writers. Because his Politics Among Nations (1948) was so comprehensive, systematic, and theoretical, it became the exemplar of this group. With the advantage of hindsight, there can be no doubt that Morgenthau’s work was the single most important vehicle for establishing the dominance of the realist paradigm within the field. Recent historians of the field all agree on this point. Stanley Hoffmann, writing in 1960 (p. 30), maintained that Morgenthau’s realist theory had occupied the center of the stage in the United States for the previous ten years. (p.36)


In order to account for the anomaly of World War II, Morgenthau attempted to delineate those realistic laws of behavior that Carr claimed the idealists had ignored. He maintained that all politics was a struggle for power, that nations strived to protect their national interests, and that the power of a nation(s) could be most effectively limited by the power of another nation(s) (Morgenthau 1960, 1973: chs. 1 and II).8 In delineating these general “laws,” Morgenthau provided a view of the world the international relations scholar was investigating and provided answers to what Masterman (1970: 62) has said are the major questions of any paradigm: What are the fundamental units of which the world is composed? How do these units interact with each other? What conception of the world should be employed to answer these questions? Morgenthau’s answers provided a view of the world that made three fundamental assumptions:
1. Nation-states or their decision makers are the most important actors for understanding international relations.
2. There is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics.
3. International relations is the struggle for power and peace. Understanding how and why that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for regulating it is the purpose of the discipline. All research that is not at least indirectly related to this purpose is trivial. (p.37)


What is important at this point is that acceptance of the three assumptions in the World War II period constituted, in Kuhn’s terms, a revolution in the way scholars viewed their world. The idealists, for example, did not believe that nations were the most important actors (Wolters 1951 [1962: 86]). To them, the most important actors were individuals and the emerging international organizations that would replace the nation-states as the organizing unit of civilization (Fox 1949: 68-71; see Bryce 1922: lectures 7 and 8). Studying these institutions and improving their processes would bring about peace. Nor did the idealists accept the second assumption. Indeed, their entire purpose was to make international politics more like domestic politics, as was emphasized by Wilson’s hopes for a League of Nations (Carr 1939: ch. 2). Finally, the assumption that international politics consisted of a struggle for power and peace was not accepted. Although the idealists believed that some selfish persons acted in terms of power politics, they did not believe that the real world worked this way. They did not believe such behavior was in harmony with the real world, because it led to war. What was in harmony with the real world could be determined by using reason to establish a new global order (Wolters 1951 [1962: 86]). This, of course, was the way to achieve the goal of the field – the establishment of peace. (p.38)


By the early 1950s, however, Morgenthau and the other realists succeeded in getting their assumptions about the world accepted by other scholars in the United States and the United Kingdom. The acceptance of the new paradigm led the field to develop the normal science characteristics of a discipline. Having settled on a picture of the world that emphasized certain phenomena and ignored others, scholars began to develop and test alternative theories and propositions about international politics that rested on the (untested) validity of the paradigm’s three fundamental assumptions. (p.38)

1950年代終わり頃から行動科学主義が国際政治学に導入されはじめます。その先駆けがカール・ドイッツュが1956年にPublic Opinion Quarterlyで発表したShifts in the Balance of Communication Flows: A Problem of Measurement in International Relationsとモートン・カプランのSystem and Process in International Politics (1957)です。

In the late 1950s and early 1960s the behavioral revolt began to make its influence felt. Among the first major scholars reflecting this new emphasis were Morton Kaplan and Karl Deutsch. Their work reflected the three main characteristics of the new approach: a concern with philosophy of science; an attempt to borrow from the physical and more “developed” social sciences; and an attempt to apply mathematical, particularly statistical, analysis to international relations inquiry. (p.40)


What the behavioralists wanted was a more systematic way of testing explanations. They believed that if their procedures were followed, truly scientific and cumulative knowledge could be gained. The procedures, which were most controversial, consisted of the use of quantitative analysis to test hypotheses. In addition, many behavioralists were not willing to grant that the traditional method produces scientific knowledge, but at best only untested conjecture (see J. D. Singer 1969: 70-72). (pp.40-1)


If the conclusion that the debate was over method and not substance is accurate, then in Kuhn’s terms it would be incorrect to think of the behavioral revolt as a paradigm-displacing event. … What the behavioralists attempted to displace was not the paradigm but the methods used to determine the adequacy of the paradigm. (pp.41-2)

The amount of attention the behavioral revolt has received has tended to obfuscate the role the realist paradigm has played and continues to play in international relations inquiry. With the exception of the methodological debate, much of the work in the field since 1948 bears a remarkable resemblance to what Kuhn has called “normal science.” In this interpretation international relations inquiry in the last thirty years or so can be viewed as an attempt to articulate the realist paradigm in light of research, while at the same time learning and debating what constitutes scientific research. This view suggests that the field has been far more coherent, systematic, and even cumulative than all the talk about contending approaches and theories implies (see Knorr and Rosenau 1969b; Dougherty and Pfatzgraff 1971; and Starr 1974: 339, 351). (p.42)

The basis of this coherence stems from the dominance of the realist paradigm. That paradigm provided a picture of the world that scholars in the 1950s and 1960s used to focus upon certain phenomena out of all possible events and to create a manageable enterprise. Morgenthau provided a particular set of concepts, explanations, and topics of inquiry that articulated the paradigm. Scholarly activity in the 1950s and 1960s can be interpreted as clarifying and systematizing Morgenthau’s concepts and explanations; providing alternative concepts and explanations that, while at times very different from those employed by Morgenthau, are still with few exceptions consistent with the three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm; and conducting research in either the traditional or scientific mode that was then used to advance the conceptual and theoretical work. The behavioralists can be interpreted as systematizing realist work according to their own criteria of adequacy and then quantitatively testing the hypotheses they derived from the paradigm. (p.42)

12月 7, 2014 · Pukuro · No Comments
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