リアリズムが国際政治学をダメにした: ミアシャイマーの二極平和論

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John A. VasquezThe Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge University Press, 1999)の第12章でジョン・ミアシャイマーの冷戦終焉後の議論を痛烈に批判しています。

第12章: ミアシャイマーの多極化の神話と現実主義者の政策的処方の嘘の約束: リアリスト・パラダイムの実証的間違い

ジョン・ミアシャイマーのサイトは→http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/
ジョン・ミアシャイマーの写真集は→http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/photos.html

モデルか(><)!!

ミアシャイマー

2005年の調査によると、ミアシャイマーは5番目に影響力のある国際政治学者だそうです。
1. Robert O. Keohane (1941), Princeton
2. Kenneth N. Waltz (1924), Emeritus California-Berkeley and Columbia
3. Alexander Wendt (1958), Ohio State
4. Samuel P. Huntington (1927), Harvard
5. John J. Mearsheimer (1947), University of Chicago
6. Joseph S. Nye (1941), Harvard(1977)
7. Robert Jervis (1940), Columbia
8. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1946)
9. Bruce M. Russett (1935), Yale
10. Robert Gilpin (1930), Emeritus Princeton
11. Peter J. Katzenstein (1945), Cornell

12. Stephen D. Krasner (1942), Stanford
13. James N. Rosenau (1924), George Washington
14. John Ruggie (1944), Harvard
15. Michael Doyle (1948), Columbia
16. James D. Fearon, Stanford
17. Immanuel Wallerstein (1930), Yale
18. Robert Cox (1926), Emeritus York (Toronto)
19. Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980), Chicago
20. Francis Fukuyama (1952), Johns Hopkins SAIS
21. J. David Singer (1925), Michigan
22. Stephen Walt (1955), Harvard
23. Jack L. Snyder, Columbia
23. Robert Axelrod (1943), Michigan
23. Stanley Hoffman (1928), Harvard

ケネス・ウォルツは1979年に出版したTheory of International Politicsで多極よりも二極の方が国際システムは安定していると主張しました。1986年には歴史学者のジョン・ルイス・ギャディスが「長い平和」という論文を発表。戦後の米ソ冷戦が熱戦にエスカレートしなかった理由を探ります。

Gaddis, John Lewis (1986) “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security 10 (Spring): 99-142. (要旨)

ミアシャイマーはベルリンの壁が壊され、冷戦体制が終わり、多くの人がこれで核戦争勃発の恐怖から解放されると安堵している中で、世界はもっと危険になると主張し、ドイツの核武装を支持する論文を1990年に発表します。

(1990a) “Back to the Future: Instability In Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Summer): 5-56.
(1990b) “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic 266 (August): 35-50.

In the summer of 1990, as the Cold War was ending and the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapsing (although that was not known at the time), John Mearsheimer (1990a, 1990b) wrote two essays arguing that we would soon grow to miss the Cold War. Building on the best theoretical knowledge available, which for him (as well as most of the field) was Waltz, he attempted to deduce what the future would be like. Contrary to the rather commonsense and non-realist view that this was a time for peace and for celebrating the apparent removal of the nuclear sword of Damocles that had been hanging over the bipolar world, Mearsheimer delineated the (deductive) dangers that lurked ahead. The article and the popularization in The Atlantic (Mearsheimer 1990b) generated quite a stir in both the academic and policy communities. (p.288)

なぜ冷戦が終わると、世界は安全でなくなるのか? ミアシャイマーはウォルツの議論に従い、二極よりも多極の方が不安定であると考えたからです。
Mearsheimer (1990a) argued that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity and hence the future would be more dangerous than the Cold War past. Following Gaddis (1986), Mearsheimer maintained, in effect, that the presence of nuclear weapons had converted the Cold War into a “long peace.” This stability and the long peace associated with it were now about to come to an end. (p.294)

Vasquezはそんなことはないと強く批判します。彼が本著を出版したのはミアシャイマー論文発表の9年後ですが、冷戦終焉により紛争が増えたという証拠は見当たりません。確かに湾岸戦争、ユーゴスラビアの内戦、ソマリア、ルワンダなどで軍事紛争は起きましたが、冷戦時代も多くの紛争が起きました。
The first and most important question to ask is: How empirically accurate is this prediction? Concurrent and subsequent events – the Persian Gulf War, the Yugoslav and Bosnian civil wars, Somalia, Rwanda and so forth – seemed to lend credence to his prediction. To look at these wars and the ethnic and border conflicts involving Soviet successor states as indicators of multipolar instability may be psychologically persuasive, but it ignores the violent disturbances of the Cold War – the Czech coup, China, Korea, Hungary, Suez, the Congo, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Middle East, Afghanistan. To these one could add a host of other inter-state wars that occurred in the system such as the India-Pakistan wars, the Iran-Iraq war and the Falklands /Malvinas. There were also numerous instances of civil political violence such as the Nigerian Civil War and the ethnic massacres in Burundi, among others. Thus, once a comparative historical review is conducted, even a cursory one, questions are raised about the accuracy of his prediction. (p.294)

In light of the evidence, it is now clear that outside the central system of the major states the post-Cold War period is not any less stable or war-prone than the bipolar period that has just passed. The prediction has not been sustained. It may be concluded that, at least to date, multipolarity has not evoked the kind of violent instability that Mearsheimer feared. (p.295)

また冷戦終焉後、大国間の平和がそれなりに保たれるようになっていますが、これは冷戦時代にはなかったことです。
For most observers, however, the end of the Cold War seems to mean that the major states (Russia, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and China) are now at peace, whereas before they were at risk of nuclear war. Unlike the “long peace” period of 1945-1989, the major states have not been, nor do they seem to be, in danger of becoming involved in a militarized crisis that could escalate to war. In the Cold War, this was always a potential danger (from the Taiwan Straits through Berlin and to Cuba), despite nuclear deterrence. In terms of the more central prediction about relations among major states, Mearsheimer seems again to be quite off the mark. This reflects badly not only on Mearsheimer’s analysis, but also on Waltz’s (1979) predictions about multipolarity In fact, one could argue that war among the major states (in any form) is probably at its lowest probability since 1871. (pp.295-6)

ネオリアリズムが始末が悪いのは、二極や多極といったものは国際社会の安定性を一義的に決定づけるわけではないという実証的証拠がいくら出ても、それを無視することです。
What is so discouraging about Mearsheimer’s analysis is that there existed a body of evidence before he wrote that showed that the polarity of the system is not as theoretically significant for producing war (and peace) as neorealists assume. Instead, the scientific research shows that neither bipolar nor multipolar systems are free from war (cf. Van Evera 1990/91: 34). What this means is that not only do Mearsheimer’s (1990a) predictions about multipolarity fail to be sustained, but the larger Waltzian theory from which he makes his deductions appears to be empirically unsound, at least in terms of what it says about bipolarity and multipolarity and war. In addition, and to a certain extent more damning for neotraditionalism, is that their ignoring of an entire body of relevant evidence underlines the risks associated with deducing policy implications from theories without paying adequate attention to scientific tests of those propositions. At best, this reflects a closed-mindedness stemming from an arrogance about one’s own mode of analysis. At worse, it reflects a paradigmatic self protection that discounts any method that appears to undercut the central tenets of the paradigm (see ch. 7 above in the original text), unless they do so in such a dramatic fashion (as in the democratic peace) that they cannot be ignored. (p.296)
(1990/91) “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Winter): 7-57.

LevyやWaymanの分析によれば、多極よりも二極の方が戦争が起きるが、その規模は小さくなります。
Levy, Jack S. (1985) “The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis” in A. Sabrosky (ed.) Polarity and War, Boulder: Westview, pp. 41-66.
Wayman, Frank Whelon (1984) “Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns among Major Powers, 1816-1965,” Journal of Peace Research 21 (1): 61-78.

多極ではいったん戦争が起きるとその規模が大きくなりがちですが、それは多極だからではなく、同盟体制が2つのブロックに二極化するときに戦争が大規模化します。
These findings seem to indicate that it is not a multipolarity of power alone that is associated with certain types of large wars, but that power multipolarity requires an alliance system that reduces these multiple poles to two hostile blocs to bring about large severe wars. This suggests that not all multipolar periods may be alike, and that some may be much more prone to war contagion and hence world wars than others. As argued in Vasquez (1993: 248), it may be the case that world wars will not occur except in the presence of specific contagion factors and three necessary conditions:
(1) a multipolar distribution of capability in the system;
(2) an alliance system that reduces this multipolarity to two hostile blocs; and
(3) the creation of two blocs in which one does not have a clear
preponderance of capability over the other. (p.299)
Vasquez, John A.  (1993)
The War Puzzle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ミアシャイマーは国際システムが多極になっても戦争勃発の可能性を減らすためにドイツの核武装化を支持しますが、Vasquezはネオリストの政策的処方があまりにも貧困なことを嘆き、代わりに紛争をエスカレートさせないための処方箋をいくつか提言します。
Mearsheimer’s (1990a) musings about multipolarity and his subsequent recommendation (Mearsheimer 1993) that nuclear weapons would reduce the danger of war between the Ukraine and Russia (see also Waltz 1981b, 1995) show that the realist paradigm is locked very much into the bipolar nuclear world of the past and is not really apprehending the very changed world of the post-Cold War era, which has its own problems and dangers. The body of theory and findings within peace research, particularly that which takes a more nonrealist bent, paints a very different picture of today’s world. It has already been shown that one feasible way of avoiding total wars within multipolarity is to avoid polarizing alliances. Of more importance, of course, would be to avoid handling conflicts of interest in a manner that increases long-term hostility and/or the probability of war. For realists, the latter is an illusion. Such conflicts are inherent (see Carr 1939) either because anarchy will always make states insecure (Waltz 1989: 40) or because international relations is a constant struggle for power (Measheimer 1994/95: 11-12). Yet this position ignores the fact that just because conflict is pervasive, this does not mean that all conflict needs to be resolved violently. One of the lessons of the field of conflict resolution is that violence can be avoided and peace attained in relationships without a harmony of interests (see M. Deutsch 1973; Pruitt and Rubin 1986; Vasquez et al. 1995). Likewise, the fact that harmonies of interest are rare does not mean they never exist; nor does it follow that all conflicts of interest are such that they are equally prone to violent solution. The realist paradigm has a difficult time seeing this, however. Such distinctions make realists nervous; they are like traumatized victims who are quick to see the world as a jungle and would rather be wrong about seeing threats where none exist, than being taken as a “sucker.” (pp.301-2)
Mearsheimer, John J. (1993) “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer): 50-66.
(1994/95) “The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security 19 (Winter): 5-49.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1981b) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
(1989) “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” in R. Rotberg and T. Rabb, (eds.) The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-52.
(1995) “More May Be Better” in S. Sagan and K. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 1-45.
Deutsch, Morton (1973) The Resolution of Conflict, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Pruitt, Dean G., and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (1986) Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, New York: Random House.
Vasquez, John, James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, and Linda Stamato (eds.) (1995) Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

ミアシャイマー 「国際制度は何の役にもたたないよ。だってウォルツ先生の本にそう書いてあるんだもん。」
In this context, an opportunity arises to build a working consensus on rules of the game that can be institutionalized in either informal regimes, like a concert of powers, and/or a host of new or reinvigorated international organizations, like the OSCE, WTO, or the UN Security Council. Mearsheimer (1994/95) questions the utility of such an approach. He argues that the optimistic view that institutions can preserve peace is not warranted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. He states, “… institutions are not an important cause of peace …” and maintains: “My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world” (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 7). Likewise in his reply to critics, he repeats that the central issue is: “… can institutions cause peace by independently affecting state behavior?” (Mearsheimer 1995: 84). He answers with a resounding no. (pp.302-3)
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/95) “The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security 19 (Winter): 5-49.
(1995) “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20 (Summer): 82-93.

Instead of trying to refute this evidence, or better still engaging in data-based research that would show why these correlations do not hold, Mearsheimer (1995: 93) asserts that “there is little evidence that they “institutions” can alter state behavior and cause peace.” The reason he says this is that he, like too many neotraditionalists, is oblivious of the findings from peace research. Instead, he goes on to show why, theoretically, the arguments of liberal institutionalists do not hold. In effect, however, all that is really shown is that such liberal arguments are at variance with the paradigm’s logic that assumes an inherent struggle for power and hence that actors will always be motivated by relative gains, not absolute gains. While this establishes one testable difference, it is neither a logical nor an empirical refutation of the liberal position. (pp.314-5)
(1994/95) “The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security 19 (Winter): 5-49.

ネオリアリストは国家は相対的利得を求めると仮定します。しかし、様々な研究がそれは状況依存的である可能性が高いことを示唆しています。相対的利得追求に関する研究は始まったばかりです。でもネオリストはすでに結論に達しているわけです。なんら実証分析もせずにです。
The question that is of fundamental importance in this debate is whether states are motivated always by relative or absolute gains. Rather than assuming it is one way or the other, it is equally plausible to think that such concerns might vary by issue area, culture, or historical period (see Snidal 1991; Keohane and Martin 1995: 44). The main point, however, is that this is primarily a research question, and that research has not even started and already conclusions have been reached! (p.308)
Snidal, Duncan (1991) “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 85 (September): 701-726.
Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin (1995) “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20 (Summer): 39-51.

「ネオリアリズムは現実主義と称しながら、現実的な政策提言をまともにできず、核兵器の拡散を支持するというアホな事を平気な顔で言いだし始めます。そんな学者が2番目と5番目に影響力があるとはお笑い草です。」とまではVasquezも言っていませんが、心の中では思っていそうです。
This case study of neotraditional discourse on multipolarity offers some important lessons about the realist paradigm. First, it demonstrates that what has been regarded as one of the pre-eminent strengths of this paradigm – the utility of its practical theory for guiding policy and providing an understanding of the political world in which states operate – may in fact not be a strength at all. The theoretical views of Waltz about multipolarity when used by Mearsheimer to provide an analysis of the immediate post-Cold War era lead to empirical predictions that are not being upheld and to policy recommendations that run counter to common sense and prudence. The latter is particularly true for Waltz’s (1995) and Mearsheimer’s (1993) position on the sanguine effects of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Instead, nonrealist prescriptions, particularly those centered around conflict resolution and findings from peace research, offer policy recommendations that seem more relevant to the current historical period and provide a vision of the future that is less prone to self-fulfilling failure. (p.313)

では簡単に感想。

冷戦が終焉してすでに25年。冷戦が終わって世界は多極化することで不安定化し、戦争も増えるというミアシャイマーの予測は見事外れました。というか、ソ連が崩壊して生じたのは多極化じゃなくてアメリカの一極化じゃないんだろうか。議論のスタートラインからおかしいような…。

安全保障に関心がある場合、二極や多極に知的関心を費やすのはかなりの時間の無駄かと思います。一国の国力なんて変えようがありませんから、二極よりも多極の方が安定している(もしくは不安定だ)という事実が判明したとしても、政治家に具体的な処方箋を提言することはできません。操作不能なものは独立変数(independent variable)ではなく、先行条件(antecedent condition)にして、操作可能なものを独立変数にした分析モデルを作る方が望ましいと言えます。すでに崩壊したソ連に軍事・経済的援助を与えてまた二極のひとつになってもらうなんてまったく不可能なので、「昔はよかった」なんて議論はたとえそれが正しかったとしても(ミアシャイマーの議論に関しては正しくないですけど)、あまり有用な情報とは言えません。「二極よりも多極の方が不安定」といった主張は、それが実証的に正しいかという問題以前に、So what?な問題提起だというわけです。

1月 19, 2015 · Pukuro · No Comments
Posted in: ☆社会科学

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