リアリズムが国際政治学をダメにした: 冷戦の終焉について

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John A. Vasquez著The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge University Press, 1999)の第13章でリアリストが冷戦の終焉を予測・説明できなかった理由を探っています。

第13章: リアリスト・パラダイムの関連性と説明力を疑って: 古典的リアリズムからネオ伝統主義

■リアリストが冷戦の終焉を予想できなかったこと

第二次世界大戦後に続いた米ソ冷戦は、ゴルバチョフとレーガンのイニシアティブの下、1989年から1990年にかけて終焉します。リアリストがこの冷戦の終焉を「予測」できなかったのみならず、リアリズムの理論的枠組みではこの事象をうまく「説明」できないというのは本当でしょうか。

Vasquezは真正の(authentic)リアリズムがなにか探ります。実はリアリストは冷戦終焉後に冷戦が終わった理由について様々な説明をしていますが(つまり、予測はできなかったが事後的に説明はできると主張)、リアリストの理論的枠組みでAという事象とAとは真逆のBという事象をどちらとも事後的説明できるのであれば、それは反証不能の退行的なリサーチプログラムと言わざるをえません。「Aが生じる」という主張は「Bは生じない」という言説を含んでいるからです。
Part of the debate over realism and the Cold War centers on which of the many allegedly realist explanations is the authentic realist explanation upon which realist theory and its paradigm should stand or fall. The authentic explanation is the one that is properly derived from the logic of the theory. If several explanations can be derived, this suggests that the theory’s predictions are indeterminate, and this is a flaw. If explanations are derived that are contradictory, this raises the question of non-falsifiability and of degenerating protean-shifts. The great risk of ex post facto analysis is that instead of specifying the explanation most consistent with the logic of the theory, explanations will be derived that conform with the known facts. (p.324)

ネオリアリストのケネス・ウォルツはソ連の国力が低下したため、冷戦は終わったと主張していますが、リアリストの多くがソ連の相対的国力が低下すると、国力を強めるために逆に拡大主義的な外交・軍事政策をとると考えていました。ウォルツもその一人です。しかし、このようにどのような外交政策も説明できるような理論は何も説明できていないのと同じです。
This effort to explain the end of the Cold War, however, suffers from both logical and empirical problems. Logically, the relative declineretrenchment proposition is an ex post facto explanation. Before the fact, realists, including Waltz, were predicting the opposite – relative decline would make the Soviet Union more aggressive and perhaps expansionistic. Explaining something after the fact in a manner directly opposite to what was said before the fact gives the distinct impression that adherents are unconsciously succumbing to the tendency of misspecifying the theory to fit subsequent events. Instead of deriving the authentic realist explanation most consistent with the logic of the paradigm, they have derived the explanation most consistent with the evidence. This impression is reinforced by the fact that, as Lebow (1994: 264) says, no realist would have predicted anything like this beforehand. (p.364)

Evangelista (1993: 159-160) points out that Waltz (1981a) himself explained on the basis of his theoretical understanding of international politics that relative economic and military weakness made a Soviet military build-up and expansion perfectly understandable. Thus, on theoretical grounds there is a sound basis for a realist prediction that decline in a major state might lead to increased armament and conflict, not retrenchment. (p.326)

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1981a) “Another Gap?” (Commentary on Robert E. Osgood, “Containment, Soviet Behavior, and Grand Strategy,”) Policy Papers in International Affairs (16): 79-80. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

Evangelista, Matthew (1993) “Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case” in R. Rosecrance and A. Stein (eds.) The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 154-178.

真正のリアリスト理論では相対的国力の低下は強硬な軍事・外交政策を生み出すと予測するので、逆の事象があった後に、相対的国力が低下したために冷戦は崩壊したとリアリストが主張するのは、リアリズムというリサーチ・プログラムが退行的であることを示しているとVasquezは主張します。
The key, however, is that this prediction was the “widespread expectation in the West” prior to Gorbachev’s changes (Deudney and Ikenberry 1991/92: 81). Since this is clearly the case, it should be concluded that the ex ante specification of realism is the authentically derived realist explanation. If this is accurate, and I believe it is, two conclusions seem to follow. First, the way in which the Cold War ended was theoretically unexpected by realist theory, because it should see a relative decline in power as the basis for an increase in conflict and not an ending of the Cold War through accommodation. Second, the actual ex post facto explanation of how and why the Cold War ended is really an attempt to change the prediction of the theory in order to fit the subsequent evidence; thereby constituting a move to dismiss falsifying evidence and escape a “real world” test that would be psychologically damaging. (pp.326-7)

■リアリストが冷戦の終焉を予測できなかった理由

リアリストという理論的枠組みで国際事象を観察すると、紛争の可能性、権力闘争、ゼロサムゲーム的な対立構造、融和政策の危険性といった側面ばかり注目するため、ゴルバチョフのペレストロイカの本質的側面が見えず、冷戦が終焉する可能性をまったく予測できませんでした。
The failure to anticipate is a serious lapse because it appears that the theoretical frame these scholars employed highlighted certain features of the US-Soviet relationship while hiding others. Both the ideology of anti-communism and the more “objective” realism tended to emphasize the possibilities of conflict, the struggle for power, the inherent conflict of interest (zero sum games and later relative gains), and the risks of appeasement. The possibilities for cooperation, for transcending the Cold War, for the creation of new games, and for escaping the security dilemma were denied or obfuscated. What is significant from the point of view of this appraisal is that these perceptual failings are precisely those that would have been expected of realism – particularly the classical realism of Morgenthau discussed in Part I of this book. (p.322)

As these nonrealist concerns and strategies motivated Gorbachev’s new thinking and foreign policy, it was difficult for adherents to the realist paradigm to see and believe that these things were happening. Such actions, like the taking of unilateral initiatives, had long been recommended by nonrealist critics, especially those adopting a social psychological approach, as actions the United States should take (see Osgood 1959; Burton 1982). Realists had opposed such initiatives as unrealistic and naive, so it was difficult to see that the enemy would ever indulge in them. According to their understanding of the world, states engaged in a struggle for power do not engage in such shifts in foreign policy unless it is a trick. (p.322)

The argument here is that it cannot be assumed that the use of realism as a frame and the failure to anticipate is an accident; rather the two seem connected, because the paradigm would by its very nature tend to obfuscate the kinds of actions Gorbachev was taking. (pp.322-3)

リアリストが冷戦の終焉を説明できない理由はいくつもありますが、リアリストが見逃したとくに重要な要因は①国内政治、②米ソ間のツー・レベル・ゲーム、③政策決定者の認知構造と学習、④平和的意向を可能にした国際制度、⑤トランスナショナルアクター、⑥構造よりも相互作用の重要性、の6点だそうです。
Even this cursory outline of a nonrealist explanation underlines the main conceptual flaws of the realist paradigm. The nonrealist explanation brings to center stage a number of variables that have been obfuscated if not outrightly ignored by the realist paradigm. These include: (1) the role of domestic politics, (2) the impact of two-level games in light of the relative influence of hard-liners and accommodationists, (3) the importance of cognitive structures and learning, (4) the impact of rules of the game (and informal institutions) on making peace possible, (5) the influence of transnational actors and coalitions, and (6) the relative importance of interactions over systemic structure. (p.347)

ソ連の国内的要因を無視すると、なぜゴルバチョフはブレジネフやチェルネンコと異なる外交政策を追求したか説明できなくなります。リーダーが変わると外交政策も変わるはずというごく当たり前のことも、リアリストの視点からだと見えなくなります。
As Evangelista (1993: 158-159) documents, the biggest drop in the percentage increase in GNP in the Soviet Union occurred in the early 1970s during the shift from the 1966-1970 period to the 1971-1975 period. The decline after 1975 and until Gorbachev came to power was “less dramatic” (Evangelista 1993: 159). Yet, Brezhnev is not noted for retrenchment as might be predicted by the ex post facto explanation, but as having a policy of building up the military and becoming involved in Afghanistan in 1979. Even if one wants to argue that Brezhnev was an exception to the general decline-retrenchment proposition, this still does not explain why his successors – Andropov and Chernenko – did not move in the direction that Gorbachev did (Stein 1994: 158).(p.327)

Realist American observers could not understand Gorbachev and did not expect his behavior, because in their realist world of the struggle for power, such a leader of such a powerful state should not exist. (p.363)

■リアリストが冷戦の終焉を予測できなかったことはなぜ問題なのか?

どんな社会科学理論でもたまには予測に失敗します。ゴルバチョフ革命に起因する冷戦の終焉は過去に類似事例を見つけることも困難な例外事例であり、例外的事象をうまく説明できなかったからといって国際政治学におけるリアリズムを否定する根拠にはならない、という主張もありえそうですが、Vasquezはそう考えません。この問題はリアリズム理論の根本的な結果に起因すると彼は考えるからです。

まず第一に、リアリズムは国際構造を所与のものと見なしているので、ゴルバチョフ革命による冷戦の終焉といった大事象を予測できないどころか、リアリストの理論的枠組みではそういったことが生じる可能性も排しているのは問題です。
These are serious concerns for any paradigm, on two grounds. First, if, in fact, a paradigm has failed to anticipate or explain a major historical event, then in what sense is the knowledge it is providing of any great relevance? The failure of scholars guided by realism to anticipate the ending of the Cold War, and particularly the manner in which it would end, speaks volumes about the ability of the paradigm to help understand change. It confirms Ruggie’s (1983) charge that one of the theoretical defects of neorealism is its underappreciation of change and its inability to explain it. (p.317)

If the historical factors that helped bring an end to the Cold War were unanticipated and not correctly identified by realists, can we have any confidence that adherents to the paradigm will understand any better the factors that are shaping the new era into which we are moving? More specifically, can a paradigm that has focused so much on conflict, violence, and zero sum games be of much relevance for problems of cooperation, peace, conflict resolution and the creation of positive sum games? (p.319)

Ruggie, John Gerard (1983) “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35 (January): 261-285.

そのため、リアリストは冷戦を平和的に終焉させるための政策ガイドラインを政策決定者に提示することができませんでした。
Realism in its various guises failed to be relevant to the immediate crisis. It could not provide a guide, first because adherents to the paradigm could not understand what was happening. Once they understood what was happening, they could not believe it was actually happening. Then once they did believe it, they had little guidance to offer. (p.363)

Vasquezは非リアリスト的な要因に注目しないと冷戦の終焉を説明できないと主張しますが、
Liberals and other nonrealists who had long advocated accommodation, escaping the security dilemma, building institutions for peace and conflict resolution were much quicker to grasp what was going on. They had plenty of policy advice to offer. Realism became irrelevant – practically and intellectually for the every day affairs of the period. (p.363)

「非リアリズム=リベラリズム」というわけではないとも述べています。
From my perspective, a paradigm shift away from realism would eliminate many of the theoretical problems realism has encountered in this historical moment. A nonrealist explanation would look at leadership shifts, changes in beliefs systems, the role of domestic politics, and the real possibilities for creating peace out of strategies of accommodation to explain the end of the Cold War. One of the distinctive aspects of Gorbachev’s foreign policy is that he adopted many of the recommendations that nonrealists had been urging upon the West as a way of extending détente and ending the Cold War … From a nonrealist perspective, power shifts or perceptions of power, played a relatively minor role in explaining the shift of Soviet foreign policy from 1985 to 1989. (pp.336-7)

There are three problems with the liberal aspect of their explanation. First, it is far from clear that democratic states were pacific or provided a benign environment for the USSR (because of their democratic nature). Second, as with realism, there is a problem of timing. The United States and Western states were democratic during the entire post-1945 period; why did this effect take about forty-four years to work? Third, when the effect did occur, it occurred under Reagan, one of the least pacific and least “benign” administrations in terms of its orientation toward communism and the Soviet Union. (p.352)

とにかく冷戦の終焉を正しく理解するためには非リアリズムの視点から国際政治事象を観察する必要があるようです。
A shift to a new paradigm emphasizes a number of factors (variables) that have been long ignored by the realist paradigm. These include the importance of domestic politics and leadership shifts for inter-state interactions, of learning and cognitive structures for changing foreign policy, of the creation of rules of the game and institutions for building peace, and of the role of territorial issues for bringing about war. All of these factors turned out to be critical in ending the Cold War. Nonrealists were better able to see these factors at work and better able to explain the Cold War, because they were tracking these factors. Realists were not; they were focused primarily on power. (p.367)

一つだけ感想。Vasquezの議論におおむね賛成ですが、ひとつ気になる点があります。リアリズムが冷戦の終焉をうまく説明できないのはよく理解できますが、戦争の予測の失敗よりも、平和の予測の失敗の方が軽症と考えワーストケースシナリオに基づく政策的処方箋を出すというのは政策論の立場からすればそれほどおかしい事ではないかもしれません。実際にリアリズムがゴルバチョフ革命に慎重な態度をとり続けていたにもかかわらず、冷戦は熱戦になることもなく終焉できたわけです。実証理論と政策論の評価基準は異なるため、前者がダメだからといっても後者もダメということにはならないかと思います。

2月 12, 2015 · Pukuro · No Comments
Posted in: ☆社会科学

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