Foreign Affairsの日本: 政治家・鶴見祐輔の日本外交論(1924年)

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1924年12月のForeign Affairsに鶴見祐輔氏がエッセイを寄稿しています。
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/1924-12-15/difficulties-and-hopes-japan
鶴見祐輔は当時39歳、内閣拓殖局、鉄道省運輸局総務課長をやめたばかりでした。英語に卓越した彼はアメリカやヨーロッパの大学に遊説し、1928年に衆議院選挙に当選し、政治家に転身します。妻は後藤新平の娘の愛子。息子は哲学者の鶴見俊輔、娘は社会学者の鶴見和子。エッセイのタイトルはThe Difficulties and Hopes of Japan。鶴見は第一次世界大戦(1914-1918)と関東大震災(1923)以後の帝国日本の軍事・外交政策について論じていますが、議論の多くは日本の対外政策ではなく国内政治の動向にあてられています。それは外交政策は国内政治の反映である(これを専門用語でsecond-image reversedと言います)と鶴見は考えているからです(ただし鶴見は対外状況の変化が国内政治に与える影響についても論じています)。
But it will not be altogether out of place here to study some of the salient factors that will contribute to the conflict of forces at home, and to consider the eventual outcome in the realm of diplomacy. For careful students of foreign affairs will not deny that the internal changes always precede the change in the foreign policy of a nation and therefore that the study of diplomacy must always go hand in hand with that of internal policies.

そして鶴見は、日本がかつて好戦的であり帝国主義的であったことを認めますが、第一次世界大戦後の大正デモクラシーにより民主化・自由化の機運が強まり、それとともに戦争よりも平和を重視するようになり、日本の対中政策と対ソ連政策が穏健化し、日中関係と日ソ関係が好転することを予想します。むろん彼の楽観的な予想は全く外れ、1929年に始まる大恐慌、1931年の満州事変以後、日本は大陸に軍事的に進出していくことになり、日中戦争とノモンハン事件を起こします。

鶴見祐輔

鶴見祐輔

明治政府は外交・領土問題を抱えていました。琉球と小笠原諸島の領有権、ロシアに対しては千島列島と引き換えに南樺太の領土権を放棄すべきかという問題。コリアの憮然とした態度に対する征伐(punitive expedition)など。
At the start, the new government of Meiji had no definite foreign policy. Officials were much exercised regarding frontier problems, and Japanese claims to the Loochoo and Bonin Islands were enforced. It proved necessary, on the other hand, to concede the northern half of Saghalien to Russia in exchange for the Kurile Islands. Japan’s relations with Korea also were anything but satisfactory. The sending of a punitive expedition to Korea was urged immediately following the Restoration, because Korea had failed to reciprocate the courtesy of the new government which had sent an official emissary to report the change of régime. The surplus energy of the samurai class, however, had quite as much to do with this agitation as the offense taken at Korea’s impolite attitude. The episode had no connection whatever with the questions which resulted later in the Japanese annexation of Korea and attracted the attention of all the world.

二人のアメリカ人

不平等条約を西洋諸国と結ばされた日本の当面の外国目標は不平等条約の撤廃でした。1872年から1875年の3年間、日本の外務省のアドバイザーを務めたGeneral Le Gendre(チャールズ・ルジャンドル)は日本が適切な大陸政策をもつ必要性があることを日本政府に諭します。ちなみに彼は1890年から1899年にかけては李氏朝鮮第26代国王の高宗のアドバイザーとなります。彼は日本で妾をもうけますが、その子が市村羽左衛門です。
The American visitor said, in effect, that Japan would be secure only if she could formulate a continental policy and carry it out before it was too late. He even said that it was the duty as well as the right of Japan.

Charles William LeGendre

彼はロシアが韓国を、イギリスとフランスが台湾を手に入れ、日本の安全保障が危機に陥ることを懸念し、アメリカがテキサスやアラスカを併合したように日本も韓国と台湾を手に入れるべきだと主張します。
The policy recommended by General Le Gendre contemplated the expansion of Japanese territory to form a crescent skirting the Asiatic mainland, and embracing both Korea in the north and Formosa in the south. He emphasized the great danger which lurked in the possibility of a Russian occupation of Korea and of an English or French occupation of Formosa. In either of these events, he contended, Japan’s security would be seriously threatened. Soyejima was urged to make the seizure of both Korea and Formosa a fundamental of Japan’s foreign policy, and as precedents for such a plan the American General cited the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of Alaska by the United States. These steps, he pointed out, had been made necessary by the Monroe Doctrine.

彼に強く影響を受けたのが副島種臣と西郷隆盛です。西郷は彼の意見を取り入れ、征韓論を主張します。
Count Soyejima was greatly influenced by General Le Gendre’s arguments, which also found high favor with Saigo of Satsuma, who had served the Restoration cause with such distinction. Since the Imperial House had regained its long-lost authority, Saigo had withdrawn from the public eye and had found himself frequently in disagreement with the policies of the new government. Although he was a member of the Cabinet, his opinions frequently were overruled by a majority of his colleagues. When he heard of the new suggestion that had come from an American official he was intensely interested and sent his right-hand man, Kirino, to Soyejima to obtain a detailed explanation of Le Gendre’s views. The idea fascinated him and immediately he began to advocate the military occupation of Korea.

Le Gendreの強硬論に強く反対したのが岩倉具視です。征韓論が認められなかった西郷隆盛は西南戦争を引き起こします。
The ambitious program was destined, however, to meet with determined opposition from Prince Iwakura, who soon returned from his travels with his able lieutenants, Okubo, Kido and Ito. The great Minister had been deeply impressed with the progress being made in western countries and returned home firmly convinced that Japan’s first need was internal reform. This difference of opinion culminated in the civil war of 1878, in which Saigo attempted vainly to compel the adoption of his aggressive views. The Imperial Government at Tokyo emerged from the brief conflict with its position strengthened rather than otherwise.

2期目終了後に来日したアメリカのグラント大統領も対外強硬策を取ることに反対し、琉球の所有権をめぐり対立していた中国と戦争をしないよう強く訴えます。ちなみに鶴見論文では彼が来日したのは1877年と書かれていますが、どうも1879年の間違いのようです。
It was just about this time that another American assisted in shaping Japan’s foreign policy. General Grant, who was touring the world after the expiration of his term as President, reached Japan in 1877. The adoption of a policy of peace was strongly urged in a long and memorable interview between the former President and the young Emperor. At the very moment a war between China and Japan was impending over the possession of the Loochoo Islands, but General Grant explained how wars among Asiatic countries could not fail to advance the plans of European countries. He explained the example and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and argued that Japan should strengthen herself by peaceful means. These calm views did much to influence the statesmen of Meiji in formulating their policy. General Grant’s advice was followed and the Japanese house was put in order.

グラント大統領の来日

官僚の民衆支配: 第一次世界大戦までの四十年間

明治憲法は1889年に発布され、その前後に自由民権運動が起きますが、運動は失敗したと鶴見は断じます。民主化運動が失敗したのは、中産階級や労働者階級が政治的にも経済的にも力を持っていなかったためだと鶴見は主張します。
But during the forty long years of agitation the liberals were not half as successful in registering popular support as were the conservatives who stood for vigorous foreign policies. Their failure may be traced to many causes, but particularly to the lack of the popular support which grew out of the nature of the country’s economic fabric. The political change of 1868 did not really affect the economic life of the nation and the former feudal lords retained their power in a changed form. Landlords and big commercial houses ruled the country, and the middle and laboring classes occupied a very insignificant place in the economic as well as the political scheme of the nation. Therefore, the fight between the conservatives and liberals was one between factions belonging more or less to the same economic stratum of society and failed to arouse enthusiasm among the common people. The latter were rather inclined to sympathize with the conservatives who had a constructive program and who succeeded in giving them at least economic prosperity and national security.

官僚支配は大多数の国民に政治的無関心を生み出し、官僚支配は社会的停滞ももたらします。
The dominance of the conservatives during forty years created a unique political situation. It meant the preponderance of the executive branch of government over the legislative and tended to centralize power in the hands of a few. These few people in the seat of power began to be closely linked up with the equally small number of people controlling the business enterprises of the country. While, therefore, Japan as a nation was making a steady advance on the Asiatic mainland and in the world at large, the political conscience of the people itself was not given a needed chance to express itself. It gradually created an atmosphere of lamentable indifference to politics on the part of the majority of the people. They were not given suffrage to express themselves and even those few who had votes realized that the exercise of their power did not mean much in formulating the country’s policy. No vital issues were fought on the days of election and the legislative branch of government gradually sank in the estimation of the people. The situation was such that it was impossible for a great leader to rise on a wave of strong popular support. The trained civil servants rose step by step quietly to seats in the cabinet, not by means of a hold on the people through their breadth of vision but by their sheer knowledge and skill in administrative work. In the early days following the Restoration the new government did not lack the vision and courage given by the infusion of new blood. In the later years of Meiji, however, the enthusiast elements gradually gave way to those with technical knowledge and loving routine work. The bureaucracy which had served to give Japan an orderly progress at home and a continuity of national policy abroad, began to lose freshness and vigor and sank to a mere unimaginative officialdom. It looked as though the government and the life of the people were two separate things. A rigid formality reigned in the former and an apathy toward politics ruled in the latter.

第一次世界大戦以後の自由化・民主化の流れ

第一次世界大戦終焉以後、日本にもリベラリズムとデモクラシーの機運が強まります。大阪毎日新聞や東京日日新聞らの発行部数が100万部を超える大新聞は、収入源の大半を広告よりも新聞販売に頼っていたため、記事の内容も大衆側に立ったものになります。
The liberals at home were not idle. Men like Prof. Nitobe and Prof. Yoshino were active in disseminating the idea of democracy. The conservatives were frightened and tried to thwart the cause by stamping it with a peculiar brand of “dangerous thoughts.” But they little realized that far more dangerous thoughts were being brewed by the changing social conditions, namely violent socialism and anarchism. By persecuting those who cherished sane ideas of liberalism and democracy they were driving sensitive and subtle minds further towards the radical cause, which from 1919 began to assume gigantic proportions in the field of labor. The newspapers of the country, with very few exceptions, were on the side of democracy. The Japanese newspapers need a word of description. Their circulation is large, and they are very powerful in formulating public opinion. The Osaka Mainichi, for example, has a daily circulation of a million and a quarter, and with its sister paper, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, enjoys that of two millions. As Japanese newspapers derive most of their income by the sale of papers and not by advertisements their natural tendency is to cater to popularity. So they are always on the side of democracy when there is any issue at stake.

国際連盟の設立は多くの日本人に強い印象を与え、戦争ではなく平和の考えに基づく国際政治観が日本国内に浸透します。
The League of Nations made a deep impression upon the Japanese. A formulation of a policy in an academic and theoretical form has a greater appeal to the Japanese mind than the solution of a particular issue in a practical businesslike way. In the project of the League they saw a translation of an ideal into a concrete policy. And it gave a new concept to the idea of international relationship. Not only the people in general but practical politicians began to change their outlook both on internal and international policies. Basing their ideas not on war but on peace, they thought they could build a new social and political policy on a more secure foundation. Therefore, when the Washington Conference came, people were in the frame of mind to accept the principles of the late Mr. Harding.

鶴見は1925年に25歳以上の男子全員に選挙権が与えられることを予想し、普通選挙制度の下で日本国内に自由主義が定着するであろうと主張します。
Now, in what way is the rising tide of liberalism in Japan going to affect her internal and international policies, and hence the problems of the Pacific? Liberal influences are now converging on a single definite point at home, that is, universal manhood suffrage. Japan now has a limited suffrage which gives the right to vote to only three million people out of the whole population of sixty million. At the root of all political evils in Japan is the problem of the enormous election expenses. It grew out of the indifference of the people to politics. They voted carelessly and mostly as they were told by local professional politicians. The universal manhood suffrage bill is the issue on which the new liberalism will test its power. If it can awaken the conscience of the people and succeed in attracting more general attention to the statecraft of the country, Japan’s future policy will take on a new color. I think I am safe in predicting that the bill will pass the two houses of Parliament in the coming winter and will become a law in April, 1925.

対中政策

日本の対中国強硬政策は1915年の対中21か条要求で頂点に達しますが、ワシントン会議以降、中国に対して融和策をとるようになったことが述べられています。
The genesis of Japan’s Chinese policy was defense. This phase culminated in the war of 1894-95. The second chapter of it was Japan’s imitation of the policies of Western Powers on the Asiatic continent,–namely, the extension of the sphere of influence and special privileges with a vague anticipation that China’s integrity might some day be jeopardized. With the increasing population at home and with the realization of the grim, cold fact that the door was closed to Japanese immigrants in countries dominated by Caucasian races, Japan’s Chinese policy began to take on a more definite form, to wit, the acquisition of raw material and the securing of markets. It culminated in the famous twenty-one demands of 1915. Subsequent changes abroad and the changing psychology at home, however, gradually worked toward the formulation of a new policy. Since the Washington Conference, Japan has definitely launched out upon a new policy toward China, namely, the policy of conciliation and peace. After the railway incident of Linshan, in 1923, Japan opposed the scheme of the foreign control of the railways suggested by a certain nation, on the ground that it infringed upon the sovereign rights of China and was in contradiction to the spirit of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference. In taking this position Japan clearly declared her disapproval of any form of foreign control of China. China was very grateful for this stand, and there has been no boycotting of Japanese goods this year. This policy of non-intervention was observed by the present Cabinet during the recent civil war in China. Suspicion has been expressed in certain quarters, but fair-minded critics should only give a verdict based on a record of facts.

Two years since, Japan embarked on a policy known as “Cultural Work in China.” Japan decided to do the same thing that America had done years ago, although in a different manner. She is going to use the whole amount of the Boxer indemnity accruing to her from 1922 to 1935 to help advance the civilization and progress of China. The sum amounts to seventy-three million yen, or thirty-six and one-half million dollars gold. The first appropriation of 5,350,000 yen was granted by the July session of the Diet this year. This will be spent in six years for the creation of two institutes of research in Peking and Shanghai. The one in Peking will be devoted to research in the field of philosophy, literature and social science, the one in Shanghai to research in the field of natural sciences. These institutes are not to be confined merely to the benefit of Chinese and Japanese scholars but their doors will be wide open to all properly qualified foreigners. The findings of these institutes are to be published in Western languages.

But what are the thoughts at the back of all these changed policies of Japan towards China? Cynics may say that Japan has been forced by the United States and England to give up her plan for dominating China, in the interest of a wider distribution of the spoils. There is no doubt some necessity in our new virtue; such situations are not peculiar to the Orient. But the new orientation of Japan’s continental policy has a deeper significance. It means the setting in of a new tide in the East. Japan realized after following vigorous foreign policies for half a century that these were not the road to her ultimate triumph and glory, which are not to be found in the mere extension of territory and the accumulation of material wealth. It also means that Japan is discovering that Western civilization, with all its parliaments, machines and laboratories, could not prevent wars, revolutions, devastations and the overthrow of states and civilizations. She has begun to turn her eyes once again to the new quest of old values, the social heritage of thousands of generations in the East.

対ソ連政策

日ソ関係も和解と友好の局面に入るであろうことを予測します。
Japan’s new policy toward China brings us to another phase of her foreign relations, that is, her policy toward a second neighbor, Russia. What Japan will ultimately do in regard to Russia is a matter of speculation. But this much can be safely said, that recent occurrences both in America and Europe are not conducive to driving Japan away from Russia. Although we once fought with the Russians, the sentiment of the Japanese people as a whole is not hostile to them. There was a strong desire even before and immediately after the war among a certain group of Japanese to find means for the friendly solution of problems arising between the two countries. The changing trend of intellectual currents in Japan in recent years worked in no way contrary to that desire. If the imperialistic designs of Soviet Russia are toned down, and when liberalism becomes securer in Japan, Japan’s policy toward Russia will take on a new phase of conciliation and friendship.

特に注意すべきwords
the World War=第一次世界大戦 ←論文執筆時にまだ第二次世界大戦は起きていないので当時、第一次世界大戦はthe World Warと呼ばれていました。それがthe First World Warと言われるようになったのは1939年以降の事です。
the Loochoo Islands=琉球
Bonin Islands=小笠原諸島
the Kurile Islands=千島列島
Formosa=台湾島
universal manhood suffrage=男性普通選挙

5月 23, 2015 · Pukuro · No Comments
Posted in: ☆戦前の日本

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